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CClitOr S riOte It is well known by now in the profession that planners are very much involved
in what has been coined "development disputes." Although nothing new, the planner's
involvement in these common differences of opinion that arise between the parties
involved in land development has become a major focus of concern. Despite the ef-
forts so far, however, no one is quite sure what the planner's role is, let alone what
it should be.
Sorting out the planner's role in development disputes is like trying to solve puzzles.
You usually have some frame of reference, like the top of the box thai the puzzle comes
in. You try to identify the colors and patterns in the disjointed mass of pieces. And
then you try fitting them together to form coherent linkages. With much patience and
perseverence, a complete picture takes shape.
The only "catch" in solving these particular puzzles is that, like all human interac-
tions, disputes are dynamic They are three-dimensional puzzles with constantly chang-
ing contexts, roles, and linkages.
In this special issue, we present articles that attempt to solve the question of the
planner's role in development disputes. The feature articles include a contextual piece
on the evolution of the bargaining process in land development; two contrasting case
studies of disputes about the siting of low income housing; and a step-by-step guide
to recognizing a situation ripe for negotiated settlement. The Forum section offers
a closer look at the developer's perspective in disputes, while "In the Works" and "Com-
mentary" address the role of planners in development dispute resolution more
specifically.
This special issue, devoted entirely to the topic of development dispute resolution,
is one that I am particularly proud to present. My thanks go to David Godschalk
and John Forester for their guidance and contributions. Also a special thanks to Marge
Victor and Dan Moseley for the excellent graphics, to Roger and his staff at University
Printing and Duplicating, and Stacey Ponticello for her constructive comments, hard
work, and friendship.
Next year, the magazine will pass into the capable hands of John DiTullio and Russell




Carolina planning welcomes comments and suggestions on the articles published and will be happy
to accept new material for future editions from interested persons. Such material should be sub-
mitted to the Editor type-written, double spaced, and not to exceed fifteen pages in length.
Carolina planning is published biannually by students in the Department of City and Regional
Planning, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, with the assistance of funds from the
John A. Parker Trust Fund, Department of City and Regional Planning.
Subscriptions to Carolina planning are available at an annual rate of $8.00, or $15.00 for two years.
e1986 Department of City and Regional Planning.
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Cpn/Zicf is a fascinating topicMis personal, emotional, and art integral part*>fany)pb. Qut public officials,
Especially planners in the public sector, are partytda unique form of conflict . In the following collection,
\some of the planners; roles', tactics, and interactions are summarily presented. See'if ygit can find*"
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.Roles- ._ etepbs^sS— {" K
;_Pur role is to listen to the neighbors, to be able to Early on we can identify constraints, tell' them to
say to the Board, "Ok, this project meets the tech-
I
jiical requirements, but there. will be impacts..-." The
1 relief will usually then ' be granted, but with
conditions. . .
If I don't think the Planning Board is representing
all the problems, then I'll attach a second report for
i the aldermen. . That's not advocacy. . .That's my
| I just tell them the rules.
Sometimes I act as someone who lets people talk
it out. They're steamed. So I just let them talk.
But I try to keep my opinions out of the public pro-
cess. I'll say, these are the applicable regulations,
here's how the proposal meets or violates them. I'll
present the facts and let people respond. I'll show
the implications of a proposal, and cite the prece-_
dents that apply. . .But people do ask you all the
time, "what do you think? What's your opinion?"
We have access to information, to resources, _to_
skills. . so developers usually want to work with
us. They have -certain problems gettinglhroughlhe---
process ... so well go to them and ask, "what do you
want?" and we'll start a process of meetings . . . It's
diplomacy; that's the real work. You -have to have
technical skills— that has to be there — but that's the







consider A, B, and C so that the project is. ready
-
. to be heard at the public hearing. We can help them
prepare for the local board: "they really care about
• -this; -so you better deal with it . . ."
It's easy to sit down with developers, or their law-
yers. They're a known quantity. They want to meet.
There's a common language — say, zoning, and they
know it, along with the technical issues. And they
speak with one voice (although that's not to say that
we don't play off the architect and the developer at
times — we'll push the developer, for example, and
the architect is happy because he agrees with us ...
)
Take an initial meeting with the developer, the
Mayor, and me. Depending on the benefits involved
— fiscal or physical — the Mayor might kick me
under the table; "not now" he's telling me. He doesn't
want to discourage the project. . 7 and so I'll be able
to work on the problems later. . .
K-
}oiux Forester teaches in the
Department of City and
Regional Planning at Cornell
University. This year, he was
Visiting Associate Professor
at the Department of Urban
Studies and Planning at Mas-
sachusetts Institute of Tech-
nology, and Research Fellow
at the Lincoln Institute of
Land Policy.
Time is mooey for developers. Once the money is
in, the clock is ticking. Here we have some influence.
—Wcmay-notbe'able to stop a project that we have
problems with, but we can look at things in more
or less detail, -and slow them down: Getting back
to them can take two days, or two months; but we
try to be dear, "we're people you can get along with,"
and so many developers will say, "let's get along with
these people and listen to their concerns . . ." -
.--:."
Citizens ihcTNeigfibdrs
But then 'there is the community. With the neigh-
bors, thefets no consistency. One week one; group
'comes in, 4nc* tr,e next week it's another. "It's hard"'"
if there is rio consistent view. One group's worried
aboSt- traffic; the other groups not worried about
traffic but about shadows. There isn't one point of
;-,- -view there;. They .also,dorft~knaw die process
(though there are those cases where there are too
L many experts!) Af
r! y l:~^\ soon c I !
*
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We'll ask for as much in the way of conditions as
we think necessary for the legitimate proteCtiqn-of
the neighborhood. The question is, "is there a legiti-
In the middle you get all theilack.Jfou'r.e.trie release
valve. You're seen as having some power. . and you
-do-have some. Look, if youTvaye a financial interest
in a project, or an emotional one, you want the per-
son in the middle to care about your points of
view. . .and if you don't think they do, you'll be
angry!
I
mate basis for complaint? And it's not just a matter
of complaint, but of merits."
Now witrrthe developers we're real up front. We'll
'say, "this is what-we4ike-, -what we don't,-what you
need to change . . ." But it's different with the neigh-
bors, .. the project' review process is a real educa-
tional process. They have to react unencumbered by
anything else than the facts of the case . . . Am I wor-
ried about swaying the neighbors? Yes — they're the-
ones who'll have to live with the building, so I have,
to let them develop their positions. . .
It's one thing to begin the discussion of a project (to
present our analysis) and anticipate the problems.
But it's another thing to rebut a neighborhood resi-
dent in public in a gentle way. . . Part of the problem
is that if you antagonize people it'll haunt you in
the future. . We're here for the long haul, and we
have to try to maintain our credibility. . .
I can tell the developers that the neighborhood con-
cerns are; I know the neighborhoods, the neighbor-
hood activists. I know what the community
wants. . .
•
Regardless with how our first meeting with a devel-




tives, (cm-th^enmtgrantingbjwd). We.usually can. 'J.
give the developer a good inkling about what to exr
pect both professionally and politically. The same
elected representatives might say that a project is
"OK" professionally, but not "OK" for them in their





So when planners try to be "professional" by appear-








On another project, we waited beforg'pushing for
changes. We wanted to let the developer get fully
committed to it; then we'd push. If wecl pushed
earlier, he might have walked away. . .
_ i
T*"J S ,' '•> .- - - ' '
;i also make appoint to tell each side the other's
-
coric^ns^rateg^nc^yTTioTwTtTrnames, but all- the-
other sides' concerns. . .Why's that important? I like
to let people anticipate the arguments and prepare
a defense — either to stand or fall on its own merits.
For people to be surprised is unfortunate. It's better
to let people know what's coming so they can build
a case. They can hear an objection — if you can retain
credibility — and absorb it; but in another setting
they might not be able to hear it. ... _ If they hear an
objection first as a surprise, you're likely to get
blamed for it. If concerns are raised in an emotional
setting, people concentrate more on the emotion
than on the substance — this is a concern of mine.
In emotional settings, lots gets thrown out, and lots
is peripheral, but possibly also central later. . .
What we do is pre-mediate rather than mediate after
the fact. We project people's concerns and then raise
them; so we do more before the fact (of explicit con-
flict) . . . the only other way we step in and mediate,
later, is when we support changes to be made in a
project, changes that consider the neighbor's views,
but that's later, after the public hearing. . .
These quotes are excerpted from a paper entitled Planning in the
Face of Conflict: Mediated-Negotiation Strategies in Local land
Use Permitting Process, by John Forester, Ph.D., available through
'(Ke "Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, 1000 Massachusetts Ave., '
Cambridge, MA 02138.
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Smoothing Out the Approval Process:
A Developer's Viewpoint
Stacey A. Ponticello Russell Berusch
W. Whitfield Morrow is a president of Fraser, Morrow, Daniels & Company in Research Triangle Park, North
Carolina. This development firm specializes in high quality, large-scale commercial, office, and residential projects.
One of the firm's current projects, still in the development stage, is Rosemary Square, which is a public-private
venture in Chapel Hill that serves as an important case study on development negotiations in North Carolina.
Mr. Morrow earned his undergraduate degree from Davidson College and his MBA from Harvard University.
CP: Your company's repertoire of development proj-
ects, especially in the Southeast, is extensive. Can you
begin by providing us with an example of the kind
of experiences you've had with the development
approval/negotiations process?
Morrow: Early in my career, while involved in the
development of Sea Pines Plantation on Hilton Head,
our company developed virtually without a public ap-
proval process. We did whatever we wanted and im-
posed our own restrictions on ourselves. Later, I had
another set of experiences working for the State of
North Carolina, trying to clean up areas that were
done without any kind of detailed approval process.
So, when you don't have a detailed approval process,
you open yourself up to a very wide range of poten-
tially negative effects. On the down side, you can have
trailers on the beach spewing sewage, if someone
wants to be entirely exploitative. On the upside,
though, you could end up with something like Sea
Pines Plantation which is much better done than
anything that has resulted from a public approval
process.
What the public approval process does is narrow
the range of possible things that can happen. I think
in many cases it eliminates the very best things that
can happen, but it also prevents the very worst things
from happening. And in many areas which have very
tightly controlled approval processes, we are seeing
the lowest common denominator of development that
is approvable. So we are only getting "approvable"
projects, and everything tends to look the same. The
streets are all exactly the same width with the same
number of trees on each side; you end up with an
army barracks kind of development process. But it
also eliminates the very intense development problems
that you get when some people exploit the lack of
control. What developers need to do is make sure that
the rules and regulations of the process allow for good
things to happen. Rather than fight every kind of con-
trol, I think development professionals should be a
part of that process of creating the rules and regula-
tions so that you can allow innovative and appropriate
approaches.
CP: At what point in the development process do you
usually begin talking to planners, board members,
citizen groups and the like?
Morrow: As a matter of company policy we go in
as soon as we have a piece of land identified and talk
with the planners and staff to make sure we have all
the rules in place. In many cases we don't get all the
information we need, and we have some surprises
later on, but we've learned that disclosing as much
as possible up front saves headaches later.
The problem we've seen is that the planning staff
frequently doesn't have time to deal with a proposed
development until you're way into the approval pro-
cess. We often produce documents, maps, and plans
Russell Berusch is a Master's
Candidate in the Department
of City and Regional Plan-
ning at the University of
North Carolina at Chapel
Hill.
Stacey A. Ponticello received
a Master's Degree from the
Department of City and
Regional Planning at the
University of North Carolina
at Chapel Hill in 1986.
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and go through a lot of expense before getting mean-
ingful conversation and review from the planning
department.
CP: You mentioned that planners' lack of time to
review pre-development proposals is a problem. Are
there gaps in planners' training that also make
dialogue difficult?
Morrow: Until recently, a lot of planning schools have
trained planners to primarily focus on the public
policy and design kinds of questions. They were
trained to believe that the developer was their enemy.
They thought their job was to limit growth and to
stop developers from messing things up. In order for
planners to be truly effective today, however, they
should be equipped with training in finance and
politics which will enable them to more fully under-
stand matters of concern to developers. So much of
what's done today in any growing area is really a
public/private venture, and development companies
must adhere to the rules prescribed by the town.
CP: What about formalizing the development negotia-
tions process — setting up rules requiring developers
and neighborhood groups to enter the process early
on in order to avoid conflicts that might emerge later?
Morrow: I think there ought to be a predevelopment
conference where the development company works
with the planning staff to outline all the major issues
that need to be dealt with. If it's a major impact pro-
ject affecting existing neighborhoods, then those
neighborhoods ought to be part of early discussions,
because any identifiable problems can usually be cured
up front. I think, in the development business, the
thing we fear the most is getting six months or twelve
months into a process and then having something new
introduced that requires going back and changing a
lot of things. It's enormously expensive to make
changes at that point.
CP: Can you put this idea of a predevelopment con-
ference in the context of Rosemary Square? Was there
any attempt to bring together conflicting forces?
Morrow: The Rosemary Square project has gone
through hundreds of review sessions— with the plan-
ning staff, the town council, the Planning Board, the
Historic District Commission, the Appearance Com-
mission and other citizen groups that have had to
review the project. In addition to that it went through
numerous public meetings. Subsequently, some people
expressed their opinions two years into the process.
The public participation process, while being very
valuable if done in the proper sequence and with pro-
per motivation, can be dangerous if abused.
CP: At what point in the approval process is it op-
timal to invite citizen participation?
Morrow: I think the critical point for citizen participa-
tion begins as early as the comprehensive planning
stage, in setting community goals and neighborhood
guidelines so that residents have said ahead of time,
before any project has been proposed, what they
would like the community to look like.
Early in a complex development process, the
developer and the staff are learning how to deal with
anything that's new or different. I think technical issues
need to be generally worked out prior to having detail-
ed public participation. In most communities there's
a zoning process that sets the guidelines. And that's
where people should participate, whether or not there's
a project proposed for the area.
The most difficult thing about citizen participation
is that many citizens who choose to participate do so
only when they oppose something. They don't do it
in a pro-active way. More importantly, the huge ma-
jority never expresses an opinion publicly. So, if we
set up a very formal process, it may only provide a
forum for the people who want to complain. This
would not be productive.
As it stands, a lot of people wait until a project is
under construction before voicing their opinions. It's
unfortunate that you can't identify ahead of time
everybody whose got a legitmate interest in a project
and can invite them to a review session. Perhaps the
planning department should do that. Maybe the plan-
ning department should identify any project that's like-
ly to be controversial and get the appropriate people
from the community to particiate in the process early
or at least give some guidance about what would be
acceptable or not acceptable.
CP: In the case of Rosemary Square did you feel that
when the going got tough and the citizens became
more vocal in their objections, the city didn't do its
part in helping to guide you through the approval pro-
cess? Because the project is a joint venture with the
city you may have expected greater assistance in get-
ting through the rough spots.
Morrow: No, I don't think the city abandoned us in
any way. The difficult thing in the Rosemary Square
process, however, is that it's a very long process. The
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Architects sketch of proposed Rosemary Square development
political players change, opinions change for various
reasons, and some people don't feel ethically bound
to live up to the commitments made by their predeces-
sors. I think that's wrong. But that's reality.
CP: How would you like to see this remedied?
Morrow: Well, I think the process is healthy in
general, except for when it's taken too far. When do-
ing a complex project you expect a detailed review.
In the Rosemary Square case I think the project has
benefited some by the long review and by some of
the subsequent changes that have been made. But I
think we're past the point of that being beneficial as
we approach final construction approval. After be-
ing selected by the council and having the project
design and scope approved, we've invested $1.1 million
in the project, in good faith, responding to town
review requirements.
CP: We talked a little bit about the planner as being
the best person to be the mediator. Do you ever think
it's appropriate for the city to hire a neutral mediator?
Carolina planning
Morrow: In the Rosemary Square process, the town
has hired numerous consultants to evaluate various
parts of the project, but the mediator-interpreter role,
by definition, is played by the town council, the town
planning board, the appointed commissions and the
town staff. That's their job — to perform that function
for the town. We have a representative form of gov-
ernment where people are elected or hired to represent
the public interest, and to replace that or circumvent
that process is a poor use of time and energy, and
an abdication of responsibility.
CP: Would your stance change if the town staff's
recommendations were biased in order to satisfy
politicians' desires, rather than guided by good plan-
ning principles?
be in the best interest of the town at all to listen to
the squeakiest wheel.
There's a vast silent majority in every town that
needs to be represented. A small vocal minority should
not run a town. In some cities, it's a development
group that's the small vocal minority. In other places,
it's a citizen lobby group that only wants trees and
parks. Even at Hilton Head, which was done marvel-
ously well, the people that bought houses there and
retired there wanted to burn the bridge and keep the
next guy out once they got their piece of the island.
In Chapel Hill, neighborhood groups, who love their
neighborhood, want to prevent any other neighbor-
hoods from being built. It's a continuing process, and
as long as there's change there are going to be people
Morrow: I don't know that there needs to be a neutral
party. The town council is elected to represent the
town in all matters of public interest. And that's what
they do. To the degree the decision makers — the
council — need information, then citizen groups, ad-
visory boards, the town staff, the development com-
pany itself, outside consultants, and others can be
called in to provide that information. I think that the
town council needs to make decisions, live by those
decisions, honor commitments and move forward
with things, and not defer complex issues to easily
distorted public referendums or to listen only to
whomever shows up at a town meeting. It may not
with a vested interest in the community as it is, who
will oppose any further change.
CP: In your negotiations with planners, do you
observe a rift between planners and developers
because planners tend to have a long range view of
a community whereas a developer is responding to
a market gap?
Morrow: A market gap is something that doesn't exist
that people want. The planner's job is to interpret what
the people want, just like developers do. And where
there are disagreements, that's where the discussion
needs to take place. I think its dangerous for both
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developers and planners to assume that they have the
exact definition of what people should want, as op-
posed to what they do want. It's much better to listen
to people and see what they want, and then provide
it in the most pleasant way.
CP: It seems one solution to a long, drawn out ap-
proval process is a tighter zoning ordinance, though
on occasion that leads to formula-like development.
Perhaps a better solution is to include more flexible
zoning devices that invite negotiations. The PUD
(Planned Unit Development) comes to mind. What
is your opinion?
Morrow: I think the Planned Unit Development pro-
cess is the most healthy thing we have right now in
the development industry. It enables you to have dif-
ferent solutions to problems — different ways to get
traffic through, different ways for recreation to be put
into a community, different rules for setbacks and so
on. I think most of our development ordinances are
drawn assuming that everybody is going to build the
same product on exactly flat land in exactly the same
relationship to other major facilities in town. And it's
just not true. We need a lot of flexibility to do things
well and create pleasant environments. The very tight
development ordinances, designed to avoid ever hav-
ing a capacity problem— with traffic, for instance —
over-design, over-engineer and over-build everything.
Many of the streets in this country have been built
based on the 1954 turning radius of a hook and lad-
der fire truck. A cul-de-sac at the end of the street
has to have a hook and ladder fire truck turn around
at the end of it when, in fact, the houses are only
twenty feet tall, and fire trucks can back up. It makes
a very unpleasant neighborhood when all of the green
space is taken up in asphalt.
I think we need to look at pleasantness issues and
spend more time saving trees than we do building
overly-wide neighborhood streets, which often result
from implementing a rigid uniform zoning ordinance.
CP: Do you think there should be limits on the length
of time over which the approval process takes place?
Morrow: I think that it should be reasonable, because
very lengthy processes drive up the cost of the prod-
uct. Except in complex, large proposals, the only
reason you have long, drawn out approval processes
is because the vision of what the town wants to look
like is not clear. If a town can establish very clear
guidelines for what is valuable in the community, up
W. Whitfield Morrow, president of Fraser Morrow, Daniels & Company
front— whether it's trees or rusticness or open space —
the process would be greatly improved. In this way,
if you bring in a project that accomplishes the general
goals and meets minimum safety standards already
established, we can go from there. That's a much bet-
ter process than setting maximum standards for
everything and not specifying the aesthetic end of
what we want.
When you have one set of official rules that evolve
into a set of economics for a community— a set of land
prices and other things — and then those rules are not
administered consistently someone may buy a piece
of land for $5 a square foot when it's only worth $3
a square foot after the planning board gets through
with it. That's a major problem, and those kind of
economic consequences are things that force
developers, even well-meaning developers, into law
suits. That's where the process really gets bad, when
the set of rules for the community are not adminis-
tered consistently and leave people wide open for
major problems. When a group of people can get
together and agree on what they want their neighbor-
hood or town to be like, then it's easy to follow those
rules.
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The Evolution of Public-Private
Bargaining in Urban Development
William Fulton
The urban development process today is typically characterized by intense study and discussion of a
project's impact upon various aspects of society. In this article, the author chronicles the rise of the major
actors involved in the urban development scene: developers, municipalities, and citizens. The actor's power
bases and modes of interaction are sketched to illustrate their effect on the urban development process.
William Fulton is a journalist
in California and a con-
tributing editor of Planning
magazine. He also is a mem-
ber of the Planning Commis-
sion for West Hollywood,
CA. Mr. Fulton holds an
M.A. in Urban Planning
from UCLA.
Introduction
Once merely a matter of getting zone changes and
abiding by a few basic rules, governmental approval
of development has become a complicated game of
bargaining in which cities and neighborhood groups
have become "civic entrepreneurs," and developers,
as Donald G. Hagman put it shortly before his
death, have become "community financiers." 1
This method of development is radically different
from past methods — indeed, the opposite of tradi-
tional zoning practice — in that it is often project-
specific and less bound by legal constraints than
traditional land-use regulation. 2 As a result, the out-
comes for both the developer and the community
have become less predictable.
This bargaining process has come about as a result
of a variety of pressures placed on the land-use regu-
lation system over the past twenty or so years. But
all these pressures are traceable to three related
developments:
(1) A growing understanding that development
has external effects and, largely through the en-
vironmental impact process, a growing ability to
identify, measure and deal with those effects on a
case-by-case basis.
(2) The rise of what might be called "citizen
power"— environmental, consumer, and neighbor-
hood groups which have forced the creation of such
tools as the environmental impact statement and
have subsequently used them to wield great power
over development, even when the groups are small
and have relatively little money. The undeniable suc-
cess of citizen power has brought citizen groups to
the bargaining table and made developers (and
cities) more willing to deal with them.
(3) The growing reluctance of political jurisdic-
tions to shoulder the external costs of private devel-
opment, leading them to push the burden onto the
developer. This practice has been far more common
in developing suburban communities than in the
older cities, and in California its growth has been
greatly hastened along by the passage of Proposition
13.
But how have these three trends converged to cre-
ate today's atmosphere of bargaining? Would certain
basic ground rules or procedures help make the
development process more predictable for the devel-
oper and still achieve the goals of the communities
and citizens groups that engage in bargaining these
days? To begin to find the answers to these questions,
we must examine how bargaining over land use has
evolved in the United States over the past sixty years.
The Inflexibility of Traditional American Zoning
Terms like "bargaining" and "flexibility" have been
dirty words since the beginning of land use regula-
tion in America. In fact, zoning was introduced to
reduce flexibility and protect property owners in
high-class commercial areas and affluent neighbor-
hoods from the encroachment of undesirable land
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uses. 3 Because the courts concluded that zoning was
derived from the police power of the state, it could
not be applied arbitrarily, and uniformity in its
application — subjecting all property owners in a
particular zone to the same standards- was needed
to resist legal attacks on grounds that the municipal-
ity was arbitrarily contracting away its police
power. 4 Good-government reformers also wanted to
eliminate flexibility in zoning to discourage corrup-
tion—a fear that proved justified over the years. 5
From the beginning, of course, flexibility did exist
in zoning, and was used — often by affluent subur-
ban enclaves to keep out undesirable additions to
their communities, and often by corrupt urban poli-
ticians to reward their friends and supporters. The
variance was suggested by the federal 1923 Standard
State Zoning Enabling Act, which intended it to be
used in hardship cases. But in practice, according
to Richard Babcock, it was used "to grant and deny
favors" to particular developers. 6 After World War
II, the special permit was added to many zoning sys-
tems, and many communities took advantage of this
additional discretion by using it to keep out such
"undesirable" uses as motels and glue works. This
widespread misuse of the special permit prompted
one prominent planning lawyer, Walter Blucher, to
ask in the '50s whether zoning was "increasingly
becoming the rule of man rather than the rule of
law." 7
Despite the successful use of variances and special
permits for exclusionary or corrupt purposes, the
zoning system remained in principle an inflexible
guide to development, designed to encourage good
city planning through general land use decisions
made in advance and discourage local officials from
assessing development projects on a case-by-case
basis. According to Professor Jan Z. Krasnowiecki,
this method of zoning, which began with the federal
enabling legislation of the '20s, left "a legacy of rigid-
ity: a system designed to prevent change rather than
to encourage it -a static, end-state concept of land
use control."8
The Will to Bargain: Citizens
With the exception of the wealthy and powerful
residents of exclusive suburban communities and the
organized downtown business interests that domi-
nated local politics in most communities, up until
i the 1960s citizen groups had little direct effect on
a community's development decisions. In the '60s,
however, the growth of the modern environmental
movement helped lay the groundwork for two im-
portant developments that led to the bargaining pro-
cess we see today: the willingness to deal with
project-specific effects of development, and the rise
of citizen groups powerful enough to take a seat at
the bargaining table.
'There is a new mood in America," the Rockefeller
Brothers Fund Task Force on Land Use and Urban
Growth reported in 1973:
Increasingly, citizens are asking what urban
growth will add to the quality of their lives.
They are questioning the way relatively un-
constrained, piecemeal urbanization is chang-
ing their communities and are rebelling against
the traditional processes of government and
the marketplace which, they believe, have in-
adequately guided development in the past.
They are measuring new development propo-
sals by the extent to which environmental cri-
teria are satisfied — by what new housing or
business will generate in terms of additional
traffic
, pollution of air and water, erosion, and
scenic disturbance. 9
The environmentalists of the late '60s were re-
markably successful in a short period of time, per-
haps because development of all kinds was coming
so quickly. In questioning the true cost of growth
for the first time, the new environmental movement
was able to force passage of the National Environ-
mental Policy Act of 1969 and, subsequently, similar
laws at the state and local levels. "Arming themselves
with technical experts, citizens used public hearings,
the media, and the courts to exert pressure on gov-
ernment to deny approvals for controversial proj-
ects," wrote planning consultant Malcolm Rivkin. 10
Almost overnight, groups of ordinary citizens ac-
quired power to stop developments cold.
Just as important, however, was the fact that the
new environmental laws acknowledged that each
land-use case is different because each development
project's "external effects"— its impact on neighbors
and on the municipality in which it is located — are
different. The environmental impact statement was
the crucial tool in this regard. Unlike zoning, it was
not a set of development limitations intended to en-
sure that all pieces of property dedicated to similar
uses were treated the same. Quite the opposite — it
was a procedure, designed to assure that each piece
of land's differences were taken into account. The
environmental impact process lends itself to discre-









forces the developer to think through the im-
pact of a project on natural conditions and
community patterns, to pay explicit attention
to alternative solutions, and to evaluate meth-
ods to mitigate adverse consequences. The
public can comment— and does. The reviewer,
lacking prescribed standards against which to
measure much of the information submitted,
can exercise considerable discretion reaching
final judgments and setting performance stan-
dards (e.g., protecting water supply and sensi-
tive land and water features, or preventing a
drain on community services). Options and
modifications are possible on matters ranging
from density to storm-water management.
Thus, the EIS can provide a legitimate frame-
work for discussion, for establishing trade-offs
and conditions — in short, for negotiation. 11
Environmentalists were not the only citizens gain-
ing power in the '60s and early 70s. Poor urban resi-
dents, feeling threatened by larger forces in society,
flexed their muscles too, gaining power and respect
and, hence, a place at the bargaining table.
Perhaps the seminal figure in this drive to organize
the urban poor was Saul Alinsky, a blunt-spoken
organizer from Chicago who gained wide acclaim
for spearheading The Woodlawn Organization's
successful stand against the University of Chicago's
expansion plans in 1960, and who subsequently
trained a whole new generation of organizers
through his Industrial Areas Foundation. 12 While
Alinsky was showing slum neighborhoods the nuts-
and-bolts of how to gain power through confronta-
tion, the federal urban renewal program of the '50s
and '60s tore their neighborhoods apart, giving them
urgent reason to organize. Later, a wave of federal
programs — most notably Community Action and
Model Cities — were structured to require more citi-
zen participation, thus encouraging the urban poor
to acquire more power. 13
The environmentalists and the urban organizers
were part of a larger trend toward the successful use
of citizen power against society's large institutions,
public and private. Both the environmental move-
ment and the rise of urban activists forced onto the
land-use agenda the social and environmental costs
of development that zoning has never addressed,
and both used conflict and confrontation to acquire
enough power to sit at the bargaining table.
The Will to Bargain: Municipalities
While the "country" and the "city" were awaken-
ing, the suburbs — where local jurisdictions have tra-
ditionally been the most effective controllers of land
use — also were coming to see that development
exacted a cost traditional zoning did not begin to
address. Whereas the EIS addressed the environmen-
tal and social costs of new development, suburban
communities began to feel the fiscal cost of sprawl.
In the late '60s and early 70s, the suburbs were
continuing to grow at an almost frightening pace.
In fact, 1973 was the high-water mark in American
history for housing starts. 14 Many planners of the
time sought to eliminate sprawl through such meth-
ods as planned unit and clustered development. 15
In addition, a large number of suburban communi-
ties began trying to guide, control, or simply limit
growth by setting up growth quotas, rating systems
for potential developments, or restrictions on de-
velopment according to the availability of such
public services as water and sewer lines. 16
Most communities, however, just wanted to make
sure the cost of capital improvements made neces-
sary by sprawl got passed on to somebody else —
namely, the new residents. Through their subdivi-
sion regulations, suburban municipalities began re-
quiring the developer or the new residents to pick
up the cost of such necessary improvements as
roads, water and sewer lines, drainage ways, and
street lights. In some cases developers would be re-
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quired to build and dedicate these facilities to the
municipality; in other cases, special assessment dis-
tricts were created to shield other residents from the
taxes needed to provide them. 17
In the '60s, as growth became more rapid, many
communities began requiring that new develop-
ments set aside land or in lieu fees for parks and
schools. 18
By 1970, this system of capital financing had been
refined further, and suburbs had begun requiring
"impact" or "development fees." These fees, based on
the number of bedrooms or homes in a develop-
ment, were used not only to provide services directly
to the new subdivision, but also to provide for ser-
vices outside the development which needed expan-
sion because of the new residents. 19 Many states
passed enabling legislation to authorize local govern-
ments to assess such fees. 20
Impact fees were treated roughly in the courts at
first— developers attacked them as being disguised
taxes, takings, and unauthorized uses of police
power. 21 Although courts still are not entirely in
agreement on the matter of impact fees, a growing
number of judicial decisions are upholding their
validity so long as there is a "rational nexus"— a rea-
sonably close relationship — between the develop-
ment in question and the use of the fees. 22
Suburban impact fees and exactions have contrib-
uted to an atmosphere conducive to bargaining by
suggesting that a developer has an obligation to "in-
ternalize the externalities" of his project, and that
this sort of internalization can be translated into
dollars paid to the city.
In the 70s, dollars became critically important to
both suburbs and cities. When the dull and gray
municipal bond market was suddenly thrown into
convulsions, municipalities had to search for innova-
tive ways to finance capital improvements. 23 In Cali-
fornia, a single event— the passage of 1978's Proposi-
tion 13, which drastically cut property taxes — had
a dramatic effect on cities' attitudes toward new
development by simultaneously cutting their main
sources of revenue and virtually eliminating the tax
benefits of new growth. 24 Thus, many communities
began to expand the definition of "rational nexus"
in an effort to get as much as they could out of a
new development— the only potential source of ex-
panded revenue they could see. 25
And, by the late '70s, they were willing to bargain
to get what they wanted. The federal Urban Devel-
opment Action Grant cast cities in the role of entre-
preneurs by rewarding aggressive municipalities for
their attempts to capture private development. As
the housing market grew competitive, local govern-
ments actually went into the development business
to make sure housing was built. 26 Others became
brokers who went beyond merely trying to attract
growth. They aggressively sought development of
the right type and in the right place. 27
Thus, cities were becoming "civic entrepreneurs"—
dealmakers accustomed to sitting down at the table
with private businessmen and hammering things
out.
The Will to Bargain: Developers
Once citizen groups and communities saw the eco-
nomic, social, and fiscal costs of growth and began
trying to deal with it, the cost of development sky-
rocketed — in terms of both time and money.
Impact fees had reached the point at which, at
least according to Hagman, they almost constituted
a buy-in fee. 28 The environmental impact process
was costing developers time and money even when
it went smoothly. It gave citizen groups the power
to challenge a project in court, sometimes on techni-
calities—a process which was bound to cost the
developer far more time and far more money even
if the challenge had no merit at all.
Furthermore, the passage of environmental laws
created a host of government agencies, such as the
federal Environmental Protection Agency and its
state counterparts, with single-issue agendas. To
developers used to working out a mutually accept-
able project with a local general-purpose govern-
ment, dealing with these agencies was a rude shock.
Nowhere did developers find a more frustrating
series of events than in California, where growth
had traditionally been encouraged. One environ-
mental agency, the California Coastal Commission,
had remarkable discretionary authority, and used
it to force developers to deal with the external effects
of development by mitigating or paying for them.
The coastal commission, brought into being through
a ballot initiative, sometimes required residential
builders to include low-income housing in their
beachfront developments; forced almost all land-
owners to provide public access to the coast in ex-
change for the smallest permit approvals; and in one
case even required a shopping center developer to
implement a series of transit improvements. 29
Furthermore, some prominent California devel-





use of the courts
modeled on labor disputes
the coastal legislation "suffered a series of crushing
rejections" from the courts. 30
And after a time in California, as the cost of hous-
ing became the dominant local issue in the late 70s,
even "general purpose" local governments began
adopting the Coastal Commission's "inclusionary
housing" demands, with varying degrees of success. 31
Facing a high-cost environmental impact process,
citizen groups that could tie their projects up in court
indefinitely, hostile single-purpose agencies, and
once-friendly local governments trying to extract as
much from them as possible, developers were more
than willing to bargain for development approvals
just to keep their projects going forward.
Bargaining Begins: Environmental Disputes
Bargaining came first to environmental disputes.
These disputes usually involved large projects such
as power plants or oil refineries, and federal and
state laws had given environmental groups tremen-
dous power to impede or stop them. In addition,
because of the project-specific nature of the legal
process, environmental disputes lent themselves
more easily to bargaining than land-use disputes did,
and some industrial and utility executives seemed
more willing to sit at the table, at least at first, than
real estate developers.
In some cases, governmental bodies — mostly be-
yond the local level — tried to head off confrontation
by creating a process that would bring developers
in and talk about the chances of their project in ad-
vance. As early as 1973, New Jersey environmental
officials set up the "preapplication conference" proce-
dure, encouraging coastal developers to discuss their
project's chances with regulators even before they
apply for a permit. 32
In many instances, however the parties to an envi-
ronmental dispute tried to set up a mediation process,
often modeled after mediation in labor disputes. These
environmental mediations met with varying degrees
of success.
In New York, for example, the longstanding con-
flicts over a number of projects on the Hudson River
were brought together and successfully mediated by
former EPA Administrator Russell Train — but Train
bowed out immediately after mediation, and the
agreement was difficult to implement without him.
In Maine, a dispute over a small-scale hydroelectric
plant was resolved when the parties agreed to mini-
mum and maximum lake levels, conditions that were
incorporated into the plant's federal license. An argu-
ment over how to extend Interstate 90 across a lake
into Seattle was extensively mediated, but environ-
mentalists were dissatisfied with the outcome and
subsequently sued. 33
Mediation in this context turned out to be far
more difficult than mediation in labor disputes,
which involve only two parties and limited issues. 34
And environmental mediation is not necessarily a
way to circumvent legal action. Because any party
may still file a lawsuit after the mediation, chances
for success are usually highest when then parties'
legal options have already been played out. 35
Nonetheless, mediation in environmental disputes
did prove that multi-party negotiation over land use
and development was possible and sometimes suc-
cessful, and several groups sprang up that special-
ized in mediating environmental issues.
Bargaining Goes Urban
In the cities, however, bargaining to resolve devel-
opment disputes met with more resistance. Though
negotiation and bargaining over urban land uses is
common in some other countries such as Japan
(where a developer might show up at a neighbor's
door with a gift), 36 in the U.S. there were consider-
able legal impediments to it, springing from the rigid
land use laws developed earlier in this century.
Nonetheless, beginning in the 70s, bargaining came
to urban areas — often in deals directly between citi-
zens and developers (with the municipality only
peripherally involved) and often with an environ-
mental basis.
An early example of successful development bar-
gaining in a built-up area came in the case of the
White Flint Mall near Washington, DC. Previous
attempts to build a shopping center in the area had
been fruitless, and a zone change was required. The
developer hired planning consultant Malcolm Riv-
kin to negotiate with the neighborhood group and
try to work out "a development scheme acceptable
to the residents yet economically feasible for the pro-
ponents."37 Working together, the two sides drew up
a special agreement, enforceable in court, that speci-
fied a number of details including a guarantee by
the developer of an appraised market value on each
home in the neighborhood. 38
Soon enough, however, the Alinsky-style neigh-
borhood activists — who did not necessarily think
in environmental terms — saw that they too could
bargain with developers and get something out of it.
In San Francisco, where housing is in short supply
Summer 1986, vol. 12, no. 1 15
but the office market has been booming, housing
activists persuaded the city to adopt an informal city
policy requiring office developers to provide or pay
for housing. 39
In that same city, as federal housing subsidy funds
dried up in 1981, poverty workers in the low-income
Tenderloin district managed to strike a deal with
high-rise hotel developers to subsidize low-cost
single resident occupancy hotels; in this case, how-
ever, the city's UDAG was used as the carrot. 40 Gen-
erally, developers grumbled but were willing to do
it to take advantage of hot markets.
More formal bargaining procedures in urban situ-
ations were hampered somewhat by the inflexibility
of land-use laws. A deal struck between a developer
and neighborhood residents was more or less private,
of course, but any sort of official deal with the city
always opened up the question of contract zoning
and even the still-unsettled legal question of impact
fees.
such devices as inclusionary housing, redevelopment
areas, and density bonuses.'12 One such authoriza-
tion was California's development agreement legisla-
tion. This law, authorizing local governments and
developers to enter into binding agreements on the
conditions of development, grew, ironically, out of
the California Coastal Commission's refusal to grant
vested rights to a large developer which had ex-
pended some $3 million on site grading but had not
obtained a building permit when the coastal initia-
tive passed in 1972. Development agreements,
strongly supported in the state Legislature by the
development lobby, were intended to protect the
vested rights of developers against future changes
in land-use laws. 43
Development agreements, which are enacted into
ordinance by local governments, have not been
widely used in California. But in Santa Monica a
liberal city government used the development agree-
ment process to require developers with fairly good,




In time, however, states began to allow more bar-
gaining. Early in the 70s, Virginia, though tradi-
tionally hostile to land-use reform, passed a law
allowing contract zoning and fast-growing Fairfax
County, near Washington, DC, used the law to
make considerable demands on developers in ex-
change for permission to develop. By 1978, the Gen-
eral Assembly had amended Virginia's zoning law
to allow for conditional zoning statewide. The "prof-
fer" system, as it is now called, has become a routin-
ized form of the zoning approval process in the
state. 41
In California, a number of state laws authorized
local governments to bargain with developers, using
but by no means airtight, vested rights claims to
make concessions to the city in exchange for per-
mission to build in the face of a moratorium.
Beyond Bargaining
Bargaining, while providing flexibility that a rigid
set of land-use rules cannot, is still a process rife with
problems. Legal problems still exist. Negotiations
among many parties — some unrepresented or even
unborn — are complicated. And bargaining takes
time. In Santa Monica, for example, the develop-
ment agreement process became so time consuming
that city officials discouraged developers from ap-





a government of deals
Because, in many instances, city, developer, and
citizen group have come to be recognized as equals
in the development process, there have been at-
tempts to move beyond bargaining and back to rigid
programs — only with vastly different ground rules.
Some cities have used the ad hoc bargaining pro-
cess as a springboard to programmatic change. In
San Francisco, the office-housing connection was
passed into ordinance by the San Francisco Board
of Supervisors. Under the program, downtown of-
fice developers pay $13.34 per square foot in fees
for housing, transit, day care, and the arts. 45 In 1983,
Boston adopted a "linkage" program, similar to San
Francisco's office-housing program, that required
downtown office developers to pay $5 per square
foot over a 12-year period into a housing trust
fund. 46
Even Santa Monica adopted firm rules. After three
years of negotiating with developers, the city council
adopted a General Plan in 1984 requiring office de-
velopers to build housing and parks or pay an in-
lieu fee of $2.25 per square foot for the first 15,000
square feet and $5 per square foot thereafter. 47
And other cities have tried innovative land-use
programs that try to get away from zoning. Ft. Col-
lins, Colo., for example, uses a kind of "performance
zoning" that does away with site-specific zoning,
and, in addition, the city agreed with the local build-
ers association on a set of mutually agreeable devel-
opment fees. 48
Such programmatic attempts, however, once
again raise the question of rigidity. Will they be flex-
ible enough to accommodate the differences in each
piece of land, each development deal? Will they re-
turn us to an era of zoning-type inflexibility? Or,
if they are general guidelines rather than specific
"end state" plans, will they merely lead to more
negotiation?
But there is a deeper question about negotiated
development — one involving fairness. Take, for ex-
ample, our attempts to "internalize the externalities,"
which lie at the heart of many of these negotiations.
Are our methods good enough so that we can iden-
tify what all the externalities are and who they af-
fect? Or will the only externalities identified be those
affecting organized interests participating in the
discussion?
Perhaps that is the most troubling question. Does
negotiated development connote the very problem
Walter Blucher warned us against thirty years ago —
a government of deals, not laws? The outcome of
negotiated development depends almost entirely on
who the negotiators are. If one neighborhood is
organized and another, also affected by the develop-
ment, is not, it is likely that the second neighbor-
hood will be left out of the final deal.
How, then, can we maintain the useful flexibility
of bargaining in land use and development without
degenerating into a free-for-all without rules? As ex-
periments with bargaining — and with more flexible
land-use programs — continue, that is the question
we must seek to answer.
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Introduction
The siting of locally unwanted land uses, termed
"LULU's," exposes shortcomings in the traditional
limited-participation development review process.
Decision making with respect to LULU's is compli-
cated because benefits typically are dispersed widely
within a community while costs are borne by a
minority concentrated near the offending project.
The typical decide-announce-defend process —
where a developer unilaterally decides to undertake
a project, announces project details in an application
for approval, then defends the project against oppo-
nents in a public hearing — may result in less than
optimal outcomes. 1
This conflict-ridden process becomes a win-lose
confrontation for both proponents and opponents.
Project approval or disapproval may ultimately
hinge on political clout, economic staying power of
the participants or judicially decided procedural
issues unrelated to the merits of the project. If proj-
ect approval is secured, as in the case described here,
opponents may find little mitigation to show for
their efforts and expense, while proponents obtain
approval only after an expensive, time-consuming
process. With any outcome, uncertainty, expense
and delay are likely. Ill will is often engendered
among participants, who may find themselves
involved in future disputes because of past antag-
onism.
This article addresses conflict surrounding the
development of a public housing project in Chapel
Hill, NC. The project and the traditional develop-
ment review process it underwent are summarized.
The process and outcome are critiqued according to
the tenets of "principled negotiation." 2 Barriers to and
opportunities for a negotiated settlement are out-
lined. A framework for an amended development
review process to include opportunities for dispute
resolution and enhanced public participation is
proposed.
The Piney Mountain Project
In March, 1986, residents began moving into 16
duplexes (32 units) of public housing on a 5.5 acre
site on Piney Mountain Road, seven years after the
Chapel Hill Housing Authority was first notified of
the availability of funds and six years after the first
site selection process began. In the interim, the
Housing Authority survived challenges to the proj-
ect in the development review process, allegations
of illegal deal-making, allegations of conflict of in-
terest on the part of the mayor, a court case and an
attempt by neighborhood residents to purchase the
site. Neighborhood residents were subjected to post-
decision disclosure of plans and meager attempts at
public participation on the part of the Authority
which left a legacy of distrust and anger toward
Town decision makers.
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The project began with notification to the Hous-
ing Authority from the Department of Housing and
Urban Development (HUD) of the availability of
federal funds in March, 1979. Like many mission
agencies, the Authority tended to define its objec-
tives narrowly: provide housing for some of the 380
families on its waiting list, take advantage of what
the Authority perceived as the last opportunity for
federal funds, and follow a "scattered sites" policy-
avoiding concentrations of public housing.
After receiving HUD funding approval in July,
1979, a site selection committee composed of
Authority board members and the Town mayor was
formed. The committee conducted a site search
through local realtors in February, 1980, one month
after the Town of Chapel Hill annexed the Piney
Mountain Road area. The committee encountered
difficulty finding suitably sized sites that met its cost
and location criteria.
Acquisition discussions with the owner of the
Piney Mountain Road site began in February, 1980.
It was only after the Housing Authority was well
on its way to receiving purchase price and site ap-
proval from HUD that neighborhood residents first
learned of the project — by questioning surveyors
working at the site. Aside from a design presentation
late in the process and apparently some unsuccessful
attempts to meet with neighbors following submittal
of the development application to the Town, the
Authority did not have discussions with neighbors
or other interested parties.
Some area residents formed the Piney Mountain
Neighborhood Association in opposition to the pro-
posed multi-family project locating in their single-
family area. The interests of the Association were
divided, with one estimate that approximately 50
percent opposed any public housing in the area, 40
percent opposed the highly visible site chosen and
10 percent opposed the design. Neighbors favoring
the project may not have joined the Association.
The Association first tried unsuccessfully to pur-
chase the site, then failed in an effort to defeat provi-
sions of a new development ordinance (adopted by
the Town in May, 1981) which allowed higher densi-
ties throughout the Town — and would permit the
project in their neighborhood. Association members
and their attorney petitioned the Town and HUD,
expressing opposition to the project and questioning
whether Housing Authority and Town decision cri-
teria were being followed. While the Authority's
application was winding its way through the Town
approval process, the Association alleged a deal had
Piney Mountain
been made to provide public housing for a relative
of the site's owner and charged the mayor, an archi-
tect, with a conflict of interest.
The Authority's application underwent the Town's
standard development review procedure involving
Planning Department analysis and recommendation
(for the project), Planning Board recommendation
(against the project), public hearing, Council vote
(7-2 for the project in September, 1981) and review
by the Appearance Commission. Because the type
of development proposed required a special permit
under the 1981 Development Ordinance, the Plan-
ning Board and subsequently the Town Council
were required to make four affirmative findings in
order to approve the project. These were: (1) the
project was located and designed so as to enhance
general safety and public welfare, (2) the project
complied with all regulations and standards, (3) the
project was located, designed and operated so as to
enhance the value of contiguous properties and (4)
the project conformed to the Town's General Plan.
The Association advocated denial on the grounds
of traffic congestion, negative impact on property
values and an excessive concentration of public
housing in their neighborhood. The Planning
Board's recommendation against approval was
based on the first and fourth findings above; it con-







and that some goals of the General Plan were in
conflict.
Following Council approval, the Association sued;
the decision in favor of the project was announced
in February, 1982.
Principled Negotiation and the Siting Problem
Roger Fisher and William Ury describe in their
book Getting to Yes, a four part method they term
"principled negotiation." Essentially, principled nego-
tiation involves:
(1) separating people from the problem — not let-
ting personalities and egos overshadow the pro-
blem to be solved,
(2) focusing on interests, not positions — looking
beyond the stated positions to their underlying
interests,
(3) insisting on using objective criteria — having par-
ticipants agree on standards by which decisions
will be made,
(4) inventing options for mutual gain — generating
several possible packages of options before mak-
ing a decision.
A review of the Piney Mountain dispute reveals
that the three main parties — the Housing Authority,
the Neighborhood Association and the Town —
violated the four tenets of principled negotiation.
Discussions with participants revealed that propo-
nents tended to regard project opponents as elitist
and perhaps racist, opposing the project out of self-
ishness and ignorance. Project opponents tended to
regard proponents as arrogant and self-righteous,
unilaterally forcing unwanted development in their
neighborhood and unconcerned as to its impacts.
Observers on both sides noted that some proponents
and opponents adopted abrasive, confrontational
approaches, further polarizing the conflict. With
these strongly held images of the people involved,
neither side ascribed much validity to the other's
stated concerns.
The Authority's strategy of selecting a site and a
development plan, then defending its position, and
the Association's strategy of attacking the site and
plan, precluded the parties from focusing on the
underlying interests — the Authority's desire to pro-
vide low-income housing and the Association's de-
sire to minimize adverse change to the neighborhood.
The one instance where the dispute came closest
to principled negotiation— the use of objective crite-
ria for granting a special permit— failed due to a lack
of definition and a lack of options. The Authority's
scattered site policy, legitimized in the Town's Housing
Assistance Plan, specified acceptable concentrations
of public housing in each of the Town's Planning
Areas. Disagreement as to whether the large Plan-
ning Areas were the suitable level of analysis and
whether exsiting or estimated future population
should serve as the basis for comparison were never
satisfactorily resolved. In essence, the parties tried
to bend the criteria to support their arguments for
or against the only option under consideration,
rather than using criteria to generate options.
The decide-announce-defend strategy precluded
the generation of alternatives; the funds were avail-
able, the site approved by HUD and the design well
under way. Without a political or judicial defeat
there would be no fundamental changes in the Au-
thority's plan.
Larry Susskind3 identified four types of partici-
pants in a siting decision. "Boosters" will favor the
project and "preservationists" will oppose it without
regard to specifics of the proposal or the approval
process. "Non-participants" will not get involved. A
significant portion of local residents (up to 50 per-
cent) will be "guardians;" their support for or opposi-
tion to a project may depend on their perception of
the fairness of the decision-making process. Public
agencies need to be careful to maintain their support.
An enhanced public participation or negotiation
framework may be an appropriate vehicle to garner
the support of both local government officials and
citizen "guardians."
Raiffa 4 and Sullivan 5 discuss factors that tend to
help or hinder the use of negotiation in a given dispute.
It is critical to analyze each situation to estimate the
effectiveness of using a negotiation framework. Sev-
eral factors indicate negotiation may have been pro-
ductive in the Piney Mountain case.
First, each party could receive gains from negotia-
tions without sacrificing its best alternative to a
negotiated agreement (BATNA): pursuing its inter-
ests through the traditional development review pro-
cess. Because plan review through a public hearing
mechanism would occur anyway, none of the parties
must abandon strategies they would otherwise use.
In addition, willingness to negotiate would signal
to decision-makers that a party was pursuing con-
structive means in the dispute. The review process
provides two other incentives to bargaining: it im-
poses a deadline and it ensures that none of the par-
ties can act unilaterally to attain its goals. A noted
exception would be if one party were certain that
Summer 1986, vol. 12, no. 1 ;:i
the Town's interests were identical to its own, thus
ensuring its desired outcome in the absense of nego-
tiation. Some might argue this was true for the
Authority in this case, but it is a risky assumption
to make in the political arena.
Public and quasi-public projects often lend them-
selves to bargaining. Because they are designed to
fulfill public interests and usually involve the expen-
diture of public funds, the property rights of the
"developer" are often regarded as weaker than in a
private development.
Another factor favoring negotiation is the exis-
tence of common areas of interest that are not of
a zero-sum nature. Early input into which objective
criteria should be used to evaluate alternatives and
how much weight various criteria should be as-
signed are examples of expanded participation that
need not involve a relinquishment of power.
Another example is joint involvement in the design
process, where neighborhood concerns might also
benefit future project residents. Design elements
may be of secondary concern to the Authority as
long as cost and scale impacts are minimal.
Given the animosity displayed during the dispute,
formal negotiations may have improved basic com-
munication among participants and helped develop
less biased analysis of technical considerations. Neu-
tral observers would likely conclude that all parties
had legitimate interests and acted in an expected
manner to further those interests. In particular, plan-
ners need to acknowledge that the "not in my back
yard" (NIMBY) response is a rational and legitimate
expression of residents' interests.
Finally, negotiations could preclude conflict
related to lack of involvement, therby shifting the
focus to the merits of the plan.
There are some factors that might tend to hinder
negotiations. Foremost among these involves final
site selection. Regardless of the process or the design,
the neighborhood in which the project is sited is
likely to resist. This results in the "reservation price"
of the neighborhood (no project at the site) and that
of the Authority (some project at the site) being
mutually exclusive. This single issue agenda would
not be conducive to negotiation since one party must
prevail at the other's expense.
In the Piney Mountain case, expense and delay
considerations may not have played as large a role
as they might in a dispute over a for-profit develop-
ment. Carrying costs and the need to satisfy in-
vestors can be a strong incentive to bargain.
There are also "structural" impediments to
negotiation. Among these are: (1) deeply held beliefs
which can preclude productive discussion, (2) the
inability of an interest group to reach consensus or
represent all its member's interests, (3) the unlikli-
hood of future negotiations on a similar project and
(4) fear that bargaining may imply legitimacy of
others' interests, lessening the probability of a
"victory ."
It is also important to recognize that any new ap-
proach to established procedures may be opposed,
largely out of apprehension to forsake something
familar for something unknown, with perhaps un-
foreseen consequences. New approaches also tend
to invite legal challenge until they become estab-
lished. In addition, constitutional or other legal
restrictions may affect the ability to employ negotia-
tion strategies in some states.
Enhanced Participation/Negotiation Process
What we term an enhanced participation/negotia-
tion process must consider several elements: what
interests are represented, who represents them, at
what point(s) in the process negotiation occurs,
what is and is not negotiable; and what role(s) the
planner may assume in the bargaining process.
Four broad classes of interests could be repre-
sented in a typical local development dispute: the
project applicant, the affected neighborhoods, the
local government and other public service providers,
and the direct beneficiaries of the project. State and
federal agencies, among others, may also have in-
terests, but for simplicity they are not addressed in
this analysis.
How interests are represented is more prob-
lematic. The applicant and the local government
tend to have adequate means to coherently express
their interests, but ad hoc neighborhood groups raise
questions of adequate representation. Whether such
groups will form and to what degree they represent
the neighborhood is uncertain. Negotiations may
be assisted by providing a mechanism for neighbor-
hood representation recognized by all participants.
A similar problem arises with regard to project
beneficiaries. In cases where beneficiaries are iden-
tifiable, such as where a waiting list for public
housing exists, representatives should be included,
perhaps using a mechanism similar to that for the
neighborhoods.
The local government's role needs to be carefully





A treeless cul de sac
criteria selection
negotiation steps
a quasi-judicial role in the development review pro-
cess, constitutional considerations suggest that the
council not become involved in negotiations.
A negotiation framework would appear to offer
several roles for planners, however. Planners may
represent town interests as reflected in plans and
policies, with the understanding that the planner can
suggest likely concerns, but cannot assure approval
or denial of any proposal. In this role, the planner
becomes one of the parties to negotiate along with
the applicant and neighborhood groups. Other
duties of a planner in this role include serving as
a liaison to neighborhood groups, either as an infor-
mation broker — ensuring that all interested groups
are kept appraised of project developments — or as
a technical assistant or advocate for a certain group
or groups; preparing estimates of a project pro-
posal's impacts, suggesting mitigation measures that
balance various parties' interests and responding to
comments on the project submitted by the public.
A planner may also serve as a mediator, helping par-
ties to define objective criteria and identify possible
mitigation measures. As a mediator, the planner
may enhance prospects for principled negotiations
as parties may not wish to appear uncooperative
before someone with access to decision-makers. For
example, the planner may suggest side payments or
mitigation measures under town purview that could
further prospects for agreement.
Many of these roles would need to be assumed
by different members of the staff as they contain
conflicts of interest. If parties to a negotiation are
not confident that different members of the same
staff can serve possibly conflicting roles, an outside
mediator may be required. 6
Perhaps the most difficult consideration is the
point at which various participants should engage
in negotiation. Based on the case study, it appears
that bargaining needs to occur between different
participants at different times. This results in in-
herent dangers that negotiations will fail since some
critical issues would be largely non-negotiable. The
incentive for the project applicant to bargain would
be too small, and the incentive for project oppo-
nents to use unprincipled tactics too great, for the
final selection of the preferred site to be negotiable.
This conclusion is based on the earlier assessment
that site selection constitutes a zero-sum issue which
will result in opposition independent of the criteria
employed to select the site. Negotiations can help
determine what criteria should be used, appropriate
mitigation for adverse impacts and site design-
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related details once a site is chosen, but not the
actual choice of the site.
A three step "negotiation on a higher plane" is en-
visioned: negotiation to determine objective criteria
and how they will be used, site selection without
negotiation, and negotiation over mitigation mea-
sures and site design elements. Implementation
recommendations include both steps to encourage
bargaining and changes to the development review
process to better embrace a negotiation framework.
The recommendations are designed to implement
the three-part "negotiations on a higher plane"
described above. Recommendations include:
1. Inclusion of an "Interests of Particular Concern"
section in the General Plan. This section lists types
of projects in which the town perceives an overriding
public interest. Each locality generates its own list,
based on its needs, and may periodically amend it
as needed. Types of projects listed might include
shelters, utilities, halfway houses, public housing
and major public facilities such as hospitals, airports
and waste disposal facilities, among others. The
listing does not supercede the normal review pro-
cess. It signals to all parties that minor to moderate
impacts of a project may not necessarily be suffi-
cient to deny approval, but must be balanced against
the value of the project to the public welfare. This
mechanism enhances the legitimacy of proponents
for listed projects and opponents for unlisted proj-
ects. It clarifies the public interest prior to any
specific development proposals and may forestall
accusations of due process abuse (such a provision
would need to be carefully crafted to avoid a due
process challenge out of hand). If passed, this sec-
tion would alert proponents and opponents alike
of those projects for which some form of negotia-
tion is expected by the locality.
2. Establishment of a recognized network of
neighborhood groups. The network may improve
communication between project applicants, local
government and the public, and minimize concerns
about power and legitimacy associated with ad hoc
groups. The town role could include approval of
organizations' bylaws to ensure adequate represen-
tation, with the following elements required: (a)
notification to all potential members about the
organization's existence and purpose, (b) a periodic
process for the democratic selection of leaders, (c)
explicit solicitation of input to, and notification of,
all public stances of the organization together with
notification of all communications received by the
organization.
The town could appoint a staff member as liaison
to the neighborhood groups, with responsibility for
providing them with information.
3. Early communication with neighborhoods for
projects listed under the "Interests of Particular Con-
cern". The quid pro quo for listing as an "interest"-
which tends to enhance the project's legitimacy —
requires communication between the applicant and
affected parties prior to site selection or detailed
planning. This enables the full spectrum of commu-
nity interests to be raised. The procedure could be
as limited as notification through the media or mass
mailings inviting comment. On a higher plane, balancing interests
notification could be followed by a public meeting
to gather further input. If a network of neighbor-
hood groups is established, a first round of negoti-
ations could be conducted. Negotiations, mediated
by the planner if requested, could identify interests,
determine possible site selection and review criteria
and inform participants of the development review
process. Thoughtful planning and careful attention
to the development of precise, unambiguous objec-
tive criteria by which potential sites will be evaluated
at this step can set the stage for a successful prin-
cipled negotiation.
4. Appointment of a task force to provide advice
during the site selection process. The task force could
be a standing committee which convenes for any
major project siting or a committee whose member-
ship is appointed on a project-by-project basis. Its
role would largely be determined by the applicant,
who would not be required to use task force ser-
vices. It is unlikely that the applicant would wish
to appear uncooperative because of the local govern-
ment's development review role. The task force
would act as a surrogate for neighborhood interests
during site selection. Operating in an advisory role,
the task force would ensure that site-specific con-
cerns are communicated to the applicant, while
safeguarding the confidentiality of the applicant's
actions. The long-term success of the task force
would depend on its ability to uphold confidenti-
ality. Task force suggestions, like those of the
planner/mediator, would not imply town sanction
of any outcome.
5. Neighborhood involvement in preliminary site group network
design and development of mitigation measures.
Analagous to the development of conditions often
accompanying the issuance of a special permit, this
step could involve substantial negotiations. At this
point, the most affected neighborhood may oppose




then be evaluated by the previously determined
criteria. Eventually, opponents will face the decision
to provide input to minimize adverse impacts while
opposing the project during the review process, or
opposing the project without providing input.
Although opponents may argue that its concerns
were not fully mitigated, it cannot charge that it was
denied involvement in the process. The local govern-
ment could thus judge the project on its merits.
6. A written, public analysis/comment/response
procedure for all projects listed as "interests of par-
ticular concern" This final procedure, occuring dur-
ing the development review process, ensures that all
concerns are raised, and responded to, prior to the
final decision on the project application. It would
include the Planning Department's written analysis
and recommendation for the project, available to
the public prior to the public hearing. The public
would have the opportunity to submit oral and
written comments on the project at the public hear-
ing. The Department would then supply written
responses for each comment to the town council and
public prior to the council's decision.
Conclusion
The enhanced participation /negotiation process
described increases public input relative to the tra-
ditional development review process. Where
lawsuits or other delays are avoided, the recom-
mended process could also save participants time
and money and improve community relations. The
negotiation process would take longer and cost more
than the traditional process if both ran smoothly.
Bargaining would tend to focus discussion on
legitimate criteria and establish more useful
precedents by minimizing conflict over process
issues. By expanding the debate, negotiation would
arguably increase the probability that the solution
most in the public interest will be selected.
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Profile of a Successful Negotiation:
The Crest Street Experience
Laura D. Bachle Laura Hill Tim Nifong
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How do you define "success" in a negotiated settlement? The following case study defines it as "Crest
St"- a low income neighborhood moved out of the way of a highway in Durham, North Carolina. Although
the parties didn't immediately concur with this appelation, their smiles belie their sense of pride in the
outcome.
The Crest Street area in Durham, North Caro-
lina, is an established, low-income, black neigh-
borhood typical of many found in southern cities.
It is intergenerational, with relatives exchanging
greetings daily, small truck gardens, and the kind
of house style that lends itself to porch-sitting.
Nonetheless, an outsider merely passing through
may not give it a second thought. But a strong sense
of community makes Crest Street very important
to many people.
In 1981, Crest Street had the look of a neighbor-
hood low on the list of the city's agenda. The streets
were in disrepair and houses had been run-down
and abandoned. Indeed, the city had something dif-
ferent in store for the area - an expressway. There
was an urgent demand for highway expansion, and
Crest Street was slated for destruction.
A year later, on December 15, 1982, the City of
Durham, the North Carolina Department of Trans-
portation (NCDOT) and the Crest Street Commu-
nity Council agreed on a mitigation plan that would
relocate the entire neighborhood. Since 1959, the
NCDOT had planned to extend the Durham East-
West Expressway to U.S. 15-501. The proposed route
travels just north of Duke University and the Vet-
eran's Administration Hospital. This article docu-
ments the success of the relocation project by detail-
ing the negotiation process.
The article is divided into four parts. Part I pre-
sents the prenegotiation phase, addressing the issues,
objectives, and institutional constraints faced by
each of the stakeholders. Part II, the negotiation
phase, discusses the techniques used, stages of the
process, alternatives generated, and the resulting
settlement. Post settlement is discussed in Part III,
presenting the implementation and monitoring of
the program, while Part IV presents an analysis of
the negotiation process based on some evaluatory
criteria.
I. The Pre-negotiation Phase.
The major participants in the negotiation included
the City of Durham (City), the Crest Street Com-
munity Council (Council), the North Carolina
Department of Transportation (NCDOT), Duke
University (Duke), and the Federal Highway Admin-
istration (FHWA). Outside groups also active at
various stages of the negotiations included Durham
County, the Durham Committee on the Affairs of
Black People, the People's Alliance, and the Durham
Voter's Alliance.
After the project's proposal in 1959, the City and
the Department of Housing and Urban Develop-
ment (HUD) showed reluctance in granting funds
until a decision was made on the Expressway. Con-
sequently, this placed the City of Durham in an
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A typical Crest Street residence prior to 1984.
early opposition
participation plans
awkward position. They lacked the necessary re-
sources to provide assistance to the Crest Street
residents for improvements, and they saw the need
for an Expressway to alleviate traffic circulation
problems within the City. The City's support for the
proposed expressway was, as proposed, in conflict
with the neighborhood's desire to remain a cohesive
community with adequate living conditions. Minor
street improvements (approximately $50,000 worth)
were finally approved a few years prior to the relo-
cation of the neighborhood.
Opposition to the "Crest Street" portion of the Ex-
pressway began as early as 1972, when a suit was
brought to enjoin construction based on violations
of the North Carolina Equal Protection Act. In 1973,
District Court granted a preliminary injunction.
These legal activities took place prior to the forma-
tion of the Crest Street Community Council in 1975.
The First Attempt.
In 1978, the City Council directed the staff to
prepare a relocation plan for the Crest Street
neighborhood. General data on the neighborhood
was collected and a Citizen Participation Plan de-
vised to involve citizens in the rehousing plan. The
plan was never implemented. In retrospect, partici-
pants feel that the failure to implement the Citizen
Participation Plan was mainly due to the plan's em-
phasis on broad representation. As meetings be-
tween the parties progressed, it was found that a
limited perspective provided by a few citizens who
had already gained respect and support from the
neighborhood could best serve the community's
interest.
Around the same time as the failed Citizen's Par-
ticipation Plan, the Crest Street Community Council
filed an Administrative Complaint with the United
States Department of Transportation. The complaint
proposed that routing of the expressway by the
North Carolina Department of Transportation was
an act of racial discrimination against the neigh-
borhood. Very soon thereafter all work ceased when
the City Council voted against the Expressway. But
after the elections, the new City Council reinstated
the plan, made it a top priority, and began to exert
pressure on the NCDOT and Governor's Office for
assistance in the relocation of the Crest Street
Community.
In 1980, the USDOT advised the State that con-
struction of the expressway would violate the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, thus validating the Administra-
tive Complaint. After debating for ten years, all
stakeholders began to push for a negotiated settle-
ment. Time, attitude, and resources were the major
factors in pushing all parties to begin to negotiate
an agreement.
II. The Negotiation Phases.
There were essentially two phases to the negotia-
tion process. After the USDOT informed the State
that the administrative complaint was valid, the
City, FHWA, and the NCDOT met to come up with
a plan of action. A Steering Committee was formed,
comprised of top officials from each interested party:
the NCDOT, FHWA, City, County, the Crest Street
Community Council, Durham Committee on the
Affairs of Black People, Duke University and the
People's Alliance. The formation of the committee
occured on April of 1980, with the first meeting in
June of that year.
The Steering Committee was essentially the first
phase of the negotiation process. One of their
primary undertakings was to appoint a task force
to study the neighborhood. Task force members, as
opposed to Steering Committee members, were not
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elected officials or particularly visible representa-
tives for their respective agencies. As mid-level ad-
ministrators and technicians, the first assignment of
the task force was to coordinate a survey of Crest
Street residents so that opinions on various issues
could be compiled. Besides appointment of the task
force, the Steering Committee reviewed five alter-
native routings of the freeway generated by the
NCDOT.
One can surmise from the minutes and opinions
expressed during this time that positional bargain-
ing, posturing, and bad faith negotiations were the
rule, rather than the exception during this first phase
of negotiations. Power relationships were estab-
lished at the expense of a negotiated settelement.
The steering committee was unable to move beyond
their political posturing, and the first phase ended
when the City Council rezoned some property ad-
jacent to the neighborhood from "residential" to
"commercial" on November 10, 1980. The neighbor-
hood notified the Department of Highways that they
were reassessing their role in the Steering Commit-
tee and would not participate in a task force meeting
scheduled for November 24th.
At this point, a ten month impasse began during
which a series of separate meetings were held be-
tween the NCDOT and the other parties. The
NCDOT reassessed their role in the negotiations and
identified alternative courses of action in January
of 1981. Essentially, they had three: (1) drop the
project - a politically and economically costly alter-
native; (2) push the project through and run the risk
of losing good relations with all parties, including
the FHWA, and eventually going to court over the
project; or (3) negotiate a settlement. Of the three
alternatives, the latter was the most desireable.
Between January and October of 1981, each of
the major parties to the conflict met separately with
the NCDOT. Basically, the NCDCT's aim was to get
the neighborhood and the City to resolve their dif-
ferences. On October 15, a full meeting of the task
force took place, signaling a new phase of the
negotiations. Although the same parties represent-
ing the same interests were there, members of the
politically visible Steering Committee no longer
participated.
Power Relationships.
When the task force reconvened, the relationship
between the members were significantly different.
Most of this change can be attributed to the legiti-
macy the neighborhood gained by virtue of the pre-
liminarily successful Administrative Complaint filed
with the USDOT and of the 1980 Steering Commit-
tee walk-out in protest of city actions.
Significant in this new round of meetings was the
relative lack of any power struggles between the par-
ties. The task force saw the Expressway extension
as a problem to be solved by team effort. Conse-
quently, it was at this point that the personalities
of the task force members really aided in negotiating
a settlement. As one interviewee put it, "the chem-
istry was just right for a settlement." The staff from
the City and the NCDOT ended up working closely
together to solve the problem. The Council clarified
that they were only opposed to the effects of the
freeway extension, and not to the freeway itself. This
made it possible for genuine progress to commence.
The FHWA played a vital role on these sessions by
interpreting the laws governing NCDOT conduct
broadly so that solutions could be generated.
Second phase negotiations took place from Oc-
tober of 1981 to December of 1982. Meetings were
held two to three times a month. The negotiators
themselves had severe time constraints that gave the
proceedings a sense of urgency— a factor that aided
the settlement.
During the course of the second phase of the
negotiations, an approximate three year time table
was imposed on the agreement. This greatly aided
all the parties in ensuring prompt and timely com-
pliance with settlement provisions.
In the beginning of the negotiations, the NCDOT
suffered from a poor image in the eyes of the Crest
Street Community Council, and not without reason,
based on the precedent set when the Expressway
displaced a similar community in the late 1960s.
This bias had to be resolved before the negotiations
could continue successfully. However, as a result of
the meetings between the Council and the NCDOT,
the Council's attitude toward the NCDOT changed,
and the neighborhood realized the NCDOT was
willing to work with them.
Strategies and Alternatives Generated.
Despite the willingness of the parties to work
together during this second phase of negotiations,
their sense of urgency, and their respect for the con-
cerns of each actor, the mitigation plan and the
negotiated settlement would never have been signed
if some key events had not occurred. Primary





last resort housing funds for public agencies (N.C.
General Statute §. 133-10.1). The funds, approved
in 1980, had been used before, but the NCDOT ad-
ministration had not made a habit of using them.
The flexibility shown by the NCDOT and FHWA
negotiators made it possible for those funds to be
used. If other parties had been involved, it is quite
possible that those funds may have never been utiliz-
ed, and consequently, no settlement reached.
Another significant event concerned the amount
new design ideas of land needed to build the interchange. This became
a major problem in resolving the dispute. About the
time the negotiations were underway, a new inter-
change concept, called the "urban diamond" was be-
ing tested in Florida. It's attractiveness was due to
its conservative use of land as compared to contem-
porary interchange designs, allowing the interchange
to be "squeezed" onto significantly less acreage.
Subsequently, this design was incorporated into the
Crest Street plan.
The NCDOT, because it was able to use last resort
housing funds, waived the usual requirement that
the City acquire a share of the right-of-way for a
major state roadway within it's bounds. This waiver
freed money for rehabilitation and relocation, and
encouraged cost-sharing efforts between the City
and the NCDOT. This decision by NCDOT was a
significant break through in the negotiations. Previ-
ously, the City had a "bottom line" for monies to
be used for Crest Street Neighborhood improve-
ments, which was not barely enough to complete
the needed rehabilitation for the neighborhood.
A litany of route alternatives were produced
throughout both phases of the negotiation process.
All but one was introduced by the NCDOT. By
December 1981, three alternatives had been tenta-
tively selected. At this point, the neighborhood
demanded that a mitigation plan accompany each
alternative. The mitigation plans were formulated
and eventually a revised version of the best alter-
native was adopted by the parties. In general, each
alternative route and respective mitigation plan was
reviewed, then relative strengths and weaknesses
were discussed to arrive at the selected agreement.
Before. . .an abandoned school
Outcome Settlement.
The mitigation plan signed by the Durham City
Council, the NCDOT and the Crest Street Commu-
nity Council contains the mitigation efforts proposed
by the above parties, and input from the FHWA.
Funds used for the relocation project included
general revenue bonds, Section 8 New Construction,
Section 202, Section 8 Moderate Rehabilitation, and
Community Development Block Grants. In one
area, the NCDOT paid all costs within the Express-
way corridor, with area activities cost shared be-
tween the State DOT (% of the costs) and the City
(V3 of the costs). Commercial redevelopment is pro-
posed for part of the City's land, with costs paid
by the City and proceeds from sales shared by
NCDOT and the City of Durham.
Construction and rehabilitation of dwelling units
consists of the following:
65 houses rehabilitated (moved)
21 units in Hicks Elementary School rehabilitated
(moved)
8 condominiums rehabilitated in place
12 new single family homes
45 Crestview Apartments
4 houses rehabilitated in place.
Recreation facilities include a park, baseball field,
and a community center. The NCDOT is responsible
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for construction of a noise abatement wall and land-
scaping along the right-of-way.
In order to accomplish the relocation project, the
City and NCDOT agreed to offer relocation assist-
ance benefits (which includes last resort housing
benefits) for all displaced Crest Street residents.
Relocatees had basically three options under the last
resort housing provision: (1) to remain owner-
occupants and purchase a replacement dwelling with
relocation assistance based on rehabilitation costs,
mortgage costs, cost of property acquisition, and
fair market value of the existing lot; (2) to remain
as tenants eligible for rental assistance payments,
through state funding (last resort housing) and/or
federal assistance (Section 202 federal loans); or (3)
to convert from tenant to home-owner through
deferred mortgage loans provided by the City.
Both the City and the NCDOT agreed to assist
the community with grant and subsidy applications.
Today, the relocation assistance has resulted in an
i increase in home ownership from 15% to almost
90% of the Crest Street residents.
A second plan, the Crest Street Community Rede-
velopment Plan, completed by the city on March
31, 1983, provides a more detailed description of
the overall agreement, indicating project costs, proj-
ect proposals, and steps for implementation.
III. Post Settlement Phase.
Task Force meetings continued once a week for
almost two years. Presently, meetings are held once
a month at City Hall. The parties now attending
the negotiations include one neighborhood represen-
tative, and two representatives from both the City
and the NCDOT. Sometimes an auditor or other in-
terested party attends. All problems and progress
reports are discussed at the meeting.
Presently, the relocation of residents is complete.
Most relocatees have chosen to own their own home
as opposed to renting it, and also have chosen
renovation over newly built homes. City costs have
exceeded earlier estimates, and are up to $4.9 million
i as a result of neighborhood preferences and ill-
advised land appraisals.
The relocation site continues to be under enor-
mous growth pressure. A portion of the potential
relocation land was sold during the negotiation pro-
cess to establish a racquet ball club. Currently, the
VA Hospital located directly south of the relocation
site wants to lease some property to build a five level
parking deck. It is also anticipated that this property
After. . . a new senior center.
will appreciate considerably as a result of the East-
West Expressway.
Post Settlement-Settlement.
The NCDOT placed a renovated house /office near
the site to facilitate relocation. They maintained a
staff that worked closely with the City in improving
the site and coordinating financing for the residents.
They also coordinated all construction and moving
of structures. The City and the NCDOT have a
maintenance agreement for landscaping, site im-
provements, and infrastructure.
Few changes have been made to the original Rede-
velopment Plan and Municipal Agreement. Largely
due to the combined efforts of all parties in prevent-
ing further amendments and hence further complica-
tions to the project, those changes that have been
made have been relatively minor. For instance, due
to the number of people who wish to own their own
home rather than to rent, the apartments planned






Jim Arthur, as a mediator for the New England
Mediation Institute, has had extensive experience in
dealing with parties to development disputes and in
working with those parties to bring about a mutual-
ly acceptable resolution. At a recent session as a
guest lecturer at the U.N.C. School of Law, he was
asked to identify factors he felt to be essential to suc-
cessful negotiation. He identified six factors: (1)
agreement on the essential parties involved in the
dispute; (2) agreement on what the critical issues at
hand are; (3) a balance of power between the essen-
tial parties involved in the negotiations; (4) a sense
of urgency to settle among the parties; (5) flexibility
as to an acceptable settlement; and (6) uncertainty
regarding the ultimate correctness of the course of
action being pursued by each party.
These criteria are similar to factors identified by
others in the field of mediation. As a tool for
evaluating negotiation success, criteria can identify
factors that aid and hinder negotiations. This pro-
vides a means of learning how to improve the nego-
tiation process.
Agreement of Essential Parties.
The old adage "too many cooks spoil the broth"
is as applicable to negotiated settlement as it is to
the culinary arts. If too many parties are involved
in an attempt to resolve a dispute, negotiations may
become so complex that final settlement is impos-
sible. Furthermore, successful implementation of a
negotiated settlement is only possible if all parties
critical to the settlement are involved in the negotia-
tion process.
Resolution of the Crest Street dispute involved
paring down the number of parties from those mere-
ly interested to those essential to implementation of
the agreement. During the two years in which
negotiations took place, no fewer than nine separate
groups were, at various times, offered the oppor-
tunity to participate in the negotiations. However,
all parties eventually realized that no more than five
of these groups were vital to the success of the
negotiated outcome. Therefore, the task force who
forged the final mitigation plan were: (1) the City,
whose municipal limits included both the Crest
Street Neighborhood and the proposed Expressway
segment; (2) the NCDOT, which served as project
overseer and final authority over the proposed
freeway; (3) the Council, whose members repre-
sented the neighborhood to be displaced; (4) Duke
University, which was a major landowner of prop-
erties adjoining the neighborhood relocation area;
and (5) the FHWA, a sort of de facto mediator early
on in the process, which represented the substantial
federal interests (both legal and monetary) in the
dispute resolution. It was soon evident that only
three parties — the City, the Council, and the
NCDOT— were essential to the resolution and im-
plementation of the final mitigation plan. Only
these parties signed the final agreement.
Critical Issues.
Just as it is important to include all parties perti-
nent to the final agreement, it is also critical that
the negotiators are in accord about the issues at
hand. The inherent nature of the Crest Street con-
flict dictated clarity. Can a state route a much need-
ed highway through a poor, close-knit community,
when no viable alternative exists? This was the issue
recognized by all three parties. But even though this
was recognized early by all the major parties in-
volved, the interests held by each major participant
biased perceptions and coloured interpretations of
the major issue.
On the one hand, the City in 1979 received what
was essentially a mandate from the electorate that
the East-West Expressway was to be completed at
any social or economic cost. This was a major plank
in the platform of the mayor and many of the coun-
cil members elected at the time. The Crest Street
Community, meanwhile, had watched the physical
condition of the neighborhood deteriorate steadily
over the years. City aid and reparation services
diminished, due presumably to the belief that the
neighborhood was "on its way out." On the other
hand, the routing was subject to the constraints of
relatively intense commercial, industrial, and insti-
tutional development in West Durham, so the
NCDOT had little real political or economic choice
in proposing the freeway corridor as it did.
It was only when the individual interests of each
major party to the dispute were recognized by the
other principals as legitimate that the parties were
able to view the major issues in the same light, plac-
ing the negotiations in a perspective capable of ren-
dering them at least potentially successful. This
ability to "see the other side" was brought on by two
factors. (1) the attainment of power and legitimacy
by the essential parties, and (2) moving the negotia-
<f
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: Neighborhood residents and NCDOT officials at a house closing.
tions from the politically visible steering commit-
tee to the less visible task force. A balance of power,
i
1
critical to issue recognition and good faith effort,
existed.
Balance of Power.
Both in the context of focusing attention on the
critical issues involved in a dispute, and of guaran-
teeing that each party's interests are considered fair-
ly, the balance of power among parties attempting
to negotiate a dispute settlement is essential. Given
the very political nature of the setting surrounding
the Crest Street neighborhood conflict, it is probable
that there would have been no negotiated settlement
had each major actor in the dispute not posessed
legitimacy. And with legitimacy came the power
represented by status substantially equal to that of
the other parties involved.
Each party derived its power somewhat different-
ly. The State of North Carolina, as represented by
the DOT here, possessed a number of powers. One
was its legal authority as the instrument of the State,
wherein it could utilize eminent domain. With this
power it could move pretty much whomever and
whatever it needed, while compensating those
moved fairly, in order to secure right-of-way for a
public thoroughfare. Further, the NCDOT posessed
the "power of the purse." As such, within its
statutory authority, it was able to finance the Ex-
pressway by whatever means were suitable and
necessary. Indeed, it was this very power relative
to legislative authorization for last resort housing
payments in 1981 (N.C. General Statutes 133-10.1)
which was viewed by all parties as a major turning
point in negotiations. Yet, the State's powers were
not limitless, as a 1980 advisory memo from the
USDOT Director of Civil Rights advising the State
DOT pointed out.
The City's power was also multi-dimensional.
With its zoning power the City was able to tighten-
or loosen — the noose around the neck of the neigh-
borhood. Of even greater importance was the
derivative power of the City conferred upon by the
voters, who clearly stated their desire that the
freeway be quickly completed in the 1979 city elec-
tions. Nevertheless, like the powers of the other state
arm — the NCDOT— both of these powers are legally
constrained (zoning designations, for example, can-





when the Council withdrew from the negotiations
in November of 1980 when the Durham City Coun-
cil was perceived as acting in bad faith in rezoning
a residential neighborhood parcel as commercial).
The ultimate power of the Council was largely de
facto, deriving from two incidents alluded to above.
The Council's September 1978 filing of an Admin-
istrative Complaint with the USDCTT alleging racial
discrimination, and subsequent preliminary agree-
ment on the matter by the USDOT, established the
Council as a power to be reckoned with. Absent
some intervening event, at the very least the State
was subjecting itself to the burden and expense of
future litigation; at the most, the Council had the
potential ability to preclude the disputed expressway
segment altogether. In the negotiations that ensued
after this event, Council's act of terminating negotia-
tions when the City acted in bad faith in the rezon-
ing incident made it clear that Council had no inten-
tions of "lying down and playing dead," but would
have to be dealt with as an equal. But as with the
other parties, the Council's powers were not
absolute — the act of walking out of the negotiations
could well have resulted in the final breakdown of
negotiations, with no guarantee that the verdict of
the racial discrimination complaint would be in their
favor.
The effect of the substantial, but not unrestricted,
powers possessed by each party to the negotiations
was to create a climate wherein each side was likely
to give due consideration to the views and interests
of other parties, in order to have that courtesy recip-
rocated. Moreover, the balance of power existing —
where no clear winner was likely to emerge via any
non-negotiated settlement route — greatly increased
the likelihood and desirability of a negotiated settle-
ment on the Crest Street case.
A Sense of Urgency.
The sense of urgency for a relatively quick settle-
ment placed upon each of the parties by the chro-
nology of events that took place before and during
the negotiations aided the agreement. In the City's
case, the electorate had made it clear that it wanted
the Expressway finished quickly. Traffic congestion
in West Durham was worsening, and continuation
of an unresolved situation created a political liability
for the City Administration. All of these facts and
events helped to spur the parties toward a negotiated
settlement, but there was a single factor which, in
the end, was one of the most important catalysts
for the February 1982 final settlement. When the
negotiations began, the City of Durham had already
been allocated HUD monies to rehabilitate as many
as 75 low-income rental units plus 20-year rent sub-
sidies for those units. Durham had already con-
sidered and rejected a number of locations for these
units, and unless they (or some portion of them)
were placed by March of 1982, the allocation was
to be withdrawn by HUD. So when the chance to
utilize those allocated monies presented itself in the
Crest Street case, the parties seized the opportunity
and carried on marathon negotiation sessions in
order to beat the HUD-imposed deadline for use of
the subsidized housing funds.
With respect to the NCDCTT, the Department had
already invested tremendous sums of time and
money in planning and in overseeing completion of
approximately 60% of the East-West Expressway.
Consequently, it could hardly back away from the
proposed "Crest Street" freeway segment. And every
delay in the construction schedule pushed up the
final cost of the project a little more.
For its part, the Council knew that no improve-
ments were going to be made to its neighborhood
by the City until and unless the Expressway prob-
lem was resolved. Further, the Council feared to be
out of step with the conservative national trend then
occurring relative to the dispute. The USDOT offi-
cials, who had advised the NCDCTT that its pro-
posed plan for the Expressway probably violated the
civil rights of the Crest Street Community citizens,
had served under President Carter. By 1981, new
officials were in place that might have reversed the
advisory opinion on the Administrative Complaint
filed by the Council. Thus, the Council, as well as
the City of Durham and the State DOT, felt pres-
sured by factors beyond their control to act in
resolving the Crest Street conflict as quickly as was
judiciously possible.
Uncertainty.
Sometimes, when a party involved in a conflict
maintains an almost irrational belief in its course
of action as "the only right course," a negotiated
settlement becomes impossible. But where some
uncertainty exists as to the correctness of the chosen
course being pursued by any individual party, that
lack of assuredness can be seized upon by the nego-
tiation process to bring the parties toward some
more central, mutually agreeable compromise. Lack
of certainty in this context means only that a party
is unsure as to the most correct course to achieve
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its objectives, and not that the party lacks convic-
tion as to those objectives.
In the Crest Street negotiations, each party had
specific interests in mind, but uncertainty existed as
to how to best realize those interests. The City, for
example, clearly wanted the East-West Expressway
completed for economic and political reasons. But
the City was unsure as to whether it was essential
to displace the Crest Street neighborhood in the first
place, and if so, how to mitigate such massive com-
munity disruption. For the NCDOT as well, there
were political risks and associated costs related to
the conflict which resulted in uncertainty. NCDOT
was used to getting things done, and from an in-
vestment standpoint needed to finish the proposed
Expressway segment as quickly as possible. Yet,
while they were more insulated from the repercus-
sions of displacing the Crest Street Community than
the City, the State Administration in power at the
time had a very real interest in minimizing the social
and political impact of displacement. The subse-
quent dilemma for NCDOT— whether to push for-
ward as planned, or put things on hold until a viable
alternative proposal could be derived — was fraught
with uncertainty as to: (1) how much time and
money to spend developing new alternative designs
for the freeway in order to mitigate its social im-
pacts, (2) the role the State should play in reloca-
tion of displaced residents (both administratively
and financially), and (3) its role in relation to the
desires and authority of the City in the dispute.
The Council wanted both to maintain the integrity
of the Crest Street Community and to improve the
quality of life for its residents. But even with what
appeared to be a strong case of racial discrimination
against the State, the Council was unsure whether
stopping the freeway altogether was the proper path
to pursue. After all, Durham did need the Express-
way to improve traffic flow and relieve congestion
in the western portions of the City (including the
Crest Street area), no truly viable alternative route
for the freeway existed, and putting a halt to Ex-
pressway construction in no way assured the neigh-
borhood of any improvements.
The net result was that the inherent uncertainty
among the major actors in the Crest Street dispute
contributed to a climate conducive to a successful
1
resolution of the conflict. The final mitigation agree-
ment replaced the uncertainty experienced by each
side with assurances safeguarding the best interests
of all major parties in the Crest Street conflict.
Celebrating a new Crest Street.
Flexibility.
It is self-evident that settlement of a dispute is
enhanced where flexibility as to the resolution of
pivotal issues exists, since this allows a whole range
of potential outcomes from which a mutually ac-
ceptable choice may be selected. In the Crest Street
case it would be fair to say that by the time negotia-
tions began, all essential parties believed in the reali-
ty, if not the necessity, of both constructing the Crest
Street segment of the East-West Expressway and the
relocating of the Crest Street neighborhood as a
community. And as the case history discussion
makes clear, a number of alternative ways existed
wherein these priorities might be accomplished.
That alternative chosen was the plan that proved
to be the most acceptable to the respective constitu-
encies represented by each of the negotiators. This
was a way of using flexibility in a non-threatening
manner.
Conclusion
The essentially successful nature of the Crest
Street negotiation can be summed up in one statis-
tic Before the relocation, 15% of the residents were
owners. After the relocation, 94% of the residents
were owners. On May 3, 1986, all of the parties met
to celebrate their success at the New Bethel Baptist
Church. Joy and satisfaction emanated from every
face. The most telling hallmark of a successful
negotiation — lasting goodwill on the part of all
parties — was displayed by the entire neighborhood.
*
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The National Institute for Dispute Resolution, in conjunction with the Harvard Program on Negotiation, has
produced a manual entitled: New Approaches to Resolving Local Development Disputes. In addition to "when
and how", the manual uses six cases to illustrate recent efforts at mediated negotiation, outlines a step-by-step
guide to using mediated negotiation, and lists sources of support for use of the technique.
"Mediated Negotiation" is a term used to describe
the role of a mediator in public disputes. A
"mediated negotiator" is someone who is concerned
with the traditional elements of mediation such as
fairness and process, as well as with the quality of
the outcome. This term readily applies to planners.
In the following excerpt from the National Institute
for Dispute Resolution, some valuable pointers are
given about how to identify a case ripe for a
mediated settlement, how to handle the negotiation,
and how to evaluate the outcome.
When To Try Mediated Negotiation
Not all local public disputes are amenable to or
appropriate for negotiation. In some cases, a con-
cerned party or decision-maker will want to use
traditional administrative, legislative, or judicial
processes to make controversial decisions or handle
complex disputes. And even when these processes
may seem less than perfect, mediated negotiation
is not always the best alternative.
Experience over the last ten years suggests that
there are certain characteristics of disputes which
make them more or less appropriate for mediated
negotiation.
Questions To Ask Before Negotiating
There are several questions which should be asked
before launching a mediated negotiation to resolve
a local public dispute.
"Are the likely parties to the dispute numerous
diverse, and hard to identify? How much power dc
they have to block implementation of any poten
tial agreement OR of any future activities that max
have been planned?"
In situations where the parties are numerous
diverse, and hard to identify, a mediated negotia
tion may be difficult to organize, but may also b
the best way to address the concerns and secure th
support of the involved parties. Typically such par
ties are frustrated by their lack of access to othe
decision-making or dispute resolution processes
They haven't the resources, clout, or expertise t(
gain entry to board rooms or court rooms, yet thei
cooperation and support may be essential to th
success of a project or policy. By including thes
people in a mediated negotiation, all are more likel
to understand each others' concerns, and to treat th
decision or proposal as a JOINT problem requirin,
joint solving and support.
In addition, there may be parties whose cooperai
tion is not critical to THIS particular project, buj
whose long run cooperation might be useful in
number of other projects. Including them in negotia:






This article is excerpted from a paper titled, New Approachi
to Resolving Local Development Disputes, developed under
grant from the National Institute for Dispute Resolution. Tf
paper will be published by NIDR later in 1986.
But
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which they have very little immediate influence may
be wise: their support and good will may be secured
for other projects in the future.
Are the parties willing to negotiate? Do they have
incentives to negotiate?
There is much debate in the mediation literature
about the appropriate "timing" of negotiations.
Some people argue that mediation only works when
a conflict is "ripe," that is, when the parties have
squared off and are ready to do battle.
In contrast, mediation can work not only to
respond to disputes that have erupted, but also to
preempt disputes before they emerge. The decision
about "when" to introduce mediation involves a
tradeoff. In the early stages of conflict, the parties
have not yet publicly committed themselves to posi-
tions; they are therefore freer to make concessions
without losing face. But in the very early stages of
conflict, the parties may not yet recognize or under-
stand the relevant issues. They may also feel little
immediate incentive to resolve their differences.
In the later stages of conflict, the parties may have
incurred substantial costs (or losses) doing battle.
As delays or lawyers' fees mount, the parties may
be more interested in resolving their differences than
they were months before. Thus, the incentives to
negotiate may be greater later in a dispute. On the
other hand, the parties may become more firmly
rooted to their positions as time passes. If they have
made their demands public, they may be very
reluctant to relax those demands in the course of
negotiations.
In the end, the mediator and the parties should
be sensitive to the dynamics of the conflict. Media-
tion can work in the very early or very late stages
of conflict, as long as (a) the parties have an incen-
tive to negotiate, and (b) they have not publicly
locked themselves into positions.
"Is there a controversial value judgment at the
heart of the dispute? Are fundamental principles in
opposition?"
In some cases, it may be appropriate for a judge
or arbitrator to render a "verdict" in a dispute. Where
fundamental notions of right and wrong are in-
volved, and where people are reluctant to compro-
mise these notions, mediated negotiation is unlikely
to work. Imagine anti-abortionist and pro-choice
proponents negotiating a settlement on federal abor-
tion rights policy. It is highly improbable.
But in some cases, disputes are less concerned with
ethical or moral judgements and more concerned
with differences in preferences. Party A wants to
open a shopping center and party B wants to
eliminate traffic from the neighborhood. These
disputes may end up being ill served by narrow legal
determinations of right and wrong, especially since
there may be ways to make all the parties BETTER
OFF by taking a broader look at the dispute.
(Perhaps Party B allows Party A to introduce a
variety of shops in the shopping center, in return
for an agreement changing two-way traffic to one-
way traffic in the neighborhood. B gets more vari-
ety in his enterprises and A gets reduced traffic and
the convenience of the center.) Mediated negotiation
can enable the parties to look at ALL the issues in
a dispute, and thus attempt to reach WIN-WIN solu-
tions that take the broader issues into account.
"Are the stakes great enough to justify the cost of
a mediated negotiation?"
The scope of any dispute resolution process
should be consistent with the scope of the issues in-
volved. The techniques described in this handbook
may be applied to a wide variety of situations.
Associated costs will vary according to the tech-
niques used and the scope of the issue. For exam-
ple, you probably do not want to launch a 10-month
negotiation effort with 50 parties just to resolve a
dispute over a traffic light.
Discussions involving the installation of one traf-
fic light should involve little cost and time. However,
plans for citywide installation of a new traffic
management system may warrant negotiations be-
tween the city, citizens, the business community and
local developers.
"Does the general public care about the outcome
of the dispute?"
In some cases, local disputes are purely "private"
affairs. The general public is unlikely to worry about
how two neighbors resolve their boundary disputes;
the public doesn't care who "wins" the fight, and it
won't care whether the neighbors ever speak to each
other again. But there are a host of public disputes
which affect a large segment of the community and
which affect relationships within the community. In
such cases the public is likely to care about the ac-
tual decision (or agreement) and the way that deci-
sion (or agreement) was reached.
Mediated negotiation is especially attractive for
these kinds of disputes. Unlike public hearings or
other public "advisory" processes, citizen represen-
tatives can shape the final decision in a mediated
negotiation. And unlike litigation, mediated nego-




tiation encourages cooperation and communication,
thus promoting better relationships in the com-
munity in the long run.
How To Negotiate Effectively
If you decide to participate in a mediated negotia-
tion, you should spend some time thinking about
your negotiation skills and strategies. Though we
cannot, in a few pages, train you to be effective
negotiators, we can suggest some questions for you
to consider as you plan your negotiation strategy.
Additional suggestions for effective negotiations are
presented by Fisher and Ury in their bestseller Get-
ting to Yes.
"What are your INTERESTS? What is it you really
care about most?" "What are the other parties' IN-
TERESTS as well?"
Fisher and Ury, in Getting to Yes, describe the
popular story of two children arguing over an
orange. The children's mother enters the room, and
witnessing the conflict, decides to resolve it in
Solomon-like fashion: she simply cuts the orange
in half.
The first child takes her half of the orange, peels
it, and discards the peel, saving the fruit for orange
juice. The second child takes her half of the orange,
peels it, and discards the fruit, saving the peel for
a cake she is baking.
Had the mother thought to ask the children what
they wished the orange for, she would have under-
stood each child's underlying interests. Each child
initially stated she wanted the entire orange, when
in fact she really only needed a part of the orange.
A better solution would then have emerged: peel the
orange and give the entire peel to one child and the
entire fruit to the other.
This (admittedly overquoted) example illustrates
how parties become deadlocked over positions when
they fail to express or consider the interests behind
those positions. In many disputes, there may be
several ways to satisfy each party's concerns, not just
those ways reflected in each party's opening
statements.
As you enter a negotiation, try to identify what
it is that you really care about in the negotiation.
Try to distinguish your most important from your
least important concerns. (You may find it useful to
concede on the least important concerns in order to
secure the more important ones.) Once you've done
this for yourself, then try to do the same for the
other parties. Try to imagine what their most and
least important concerns are. If you can develop pro-
posals to satisfy their most important concerns
which cost you little, you will win their support and
move the entire group towards a mutually beneficial
agreement.
"What are your ALTERNATIVES to a negotiated
agreement?" "What are the other parties' alter-
natives?"
In any negotiation, you should spend some time
evaluating your alternatives to the negotiation.
What is your best alternative if negotiations fail?
Can you win your case in court? Can you persuade
the key decision-makers on your own? Will you lose
friends?
Your "best alternative to a negotiated agreement"
(or BATNA as Fisher and Ury express it) can be a
useful yardstick for evaluating proposals made by
other parties. Should someone offer you a settle-
ment less attractive than your best alternative, you
should probably not settle. On the other hand, if
someone makes a proposal that is better than your
best alternative, you should think twice before re-
jecting it. Consider the negotiation an OPPOR-
TUNITY to do better than your non-negotiation
alternatives.
It also pays to think about the alternatives facing
the other parties in the dispute. Unless you can make
a proposal that beats their own BATNA's, you are
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unlikely to secure their agreement. Moreover, the
better their alternatives, the more effort you may
have to make to accommodate them in a settlement.
"Can you work together to BRAINSTORM some
I
creative OPTIONS without commiting yourself to
these options?"
Negotiations are often most productive when the
parties work together to "brainstorm" or invent op-
tions. According to the authors of Making Meetings
Work, Michael Doyle and David Straus, unfettered
brainstorming often leads to unusual and highly
creative solutions to problems.
But the inventiveness of brainstorming sessions
|
can be limited if the parties feel they will be bound
1
by all the suggestions they make. People will hesitate
t.\ to make creative, "off the top of the head" sugges-
t tions before they've had a chance to analyze each
suggestion completely.
Consequently, a skilled facilitator or mediator will
encourage the parties to invent options freely at dif-
I ferent points during a negotiation, if only to
stimulate creative thinking. Analysis of the options
I
can then take place at a later point in the
negotiations.
"How well are we COMMUNICATING with each
other? How well are we LISTENING to each other?"
In the highly charged atmosphere of negotiations,
it is often easy to misunderstand the other parties
and to be misunderstood by them. If you do not
understand what each other cares about, you will
have an extremely difficult time framing proposals
that are acceptable to each other.
It therefore makes sense to test, periodically, the
accuracy of communications taking place in the
negotiations. You can double check by asking the
other parties to restate for you what you just said.
You might do this in a non-offensive way by say-
ing, "I think we may have misunderstood each other.
What did you think I was saying?" Likewise, you
might offer to restate their previous statements in
' order to doublecheck your listening skills. You can
say, "I'm sorry, but I may have misunderstood you.
Did you mean to say that. . .?"
"How stable or secure are the other parties'
COMMITMENTS to the final agreement?"
It is often tempting to believe commitments are
firm when a very attractive proposal is on the table.
If you stand to benefit a great deal from a proposal,
you may be reluctant to ask the other parties one
last time, 'Yes, but do you PROMISE to do such and
such?"
Nevertheless, it is usually wise to secure everyone's
else's commitments before you agree to sign the final
proposal. If you can persuade the other parties to
sign contracts, post bonds, or make public promises,
terrific. But if you can only count on their word to
secure their commitments, then take the time to
study the commitments they have made. Make sure
they have promised to do things they CAN, in fact,
do. And try to make sure they have as little incen-
tive as possible to renege on their agreement.
"What is happening to the RELATIONSHIPS bet-
ween the parties in this negotiation?"
If you were haggling with a rug vendor in a
Turkish bazaar while on vacation, you might not
be concerned about the impact your negotiations
were having on your relationship with the vendor.
Odds are, after the vacation ends, you will never
see that vendor again. In addition, it is probably
unlikely that he will ever speak of you to someone
else who knows you or does business with you.
But relationships in communities may be a much
different story. In a public dispute in your own com-
munity, you may care a great deal about your rep-
utation and relationships with the other parties.
Fisher and Ury urge negotiators to "separate the
people from the problem." This is, in part, a purely
practical issue. The other parties are unlikely to
agree to anything if you spend all your energy
separate people from problen
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courteous, honest, fair
perception of the agreement
offending them. In addition, the issues at the heart
of the dispute are probably complex enough to
demand your full attention.
But there is another reason for separating the peo-
ple from the problem. It protects you from parties
who would try to exact concessions from you in
return for their good will. If you are courteous,
honest, and fair with each other, then good will
should naturally emerge from the negotiations (or
at the least, little damage should be done). Don't
allow yourself to be blackmailed into giving in
because someone threatens to cut off communi-
cations with you. Keep the discussions focused
on your legitimate interests, and away from
personalities.
In the end, regardless of how you may feel about
the other parties, most of you will have a common
goal. You will want to see the dispute resolved to
everyone's satisfaction as soon as possible. And if
relationships are improved in the process, so much
the better. The negotiations will have generated both
immediate and long run benefits.
"How will the agreement be viewed by the com-
munity at large? Will it be viewed as LEGITIMATE?"
Throughout this manual, we have been describ-
ing local PUBLIC disputes in which public officials
are involved. These officials must worry about the
public's perception of any agreement they accept,
because they serve at the pleasure of the public.
Even if you are not a public official, you too
should care about the public's perception of the
agreement. If the public feels the final agreement
is unfair and illegitimate, public representatives may
actively try to undermine the agreement.
There are, of course, many ways to evaluate the
fairness and legitimacy of the final agreement. It
may help everyone to agree on some standards of
fairness in the course of the negotiations, to ensure
that the final agreement conforms to those standards
of fairness. (Fisher and Ury describe this as
establishing "objective criteria.")
In addition, the public is likely to be less critical
of any agreement which is generated by an "open
and fair" process. If all parties with a legitimate stake
in the dispute have been allowed to participate in
the negotiations, then the rest of the community
may be hard pressed to criticize the final agreement.
How To Identify A Good Agreement
As mentioned above, there may be many ways
to evaluate a good agreement. One way is based on
the content of the agreement. Another is based on
the process by which it was generated.
Roger Fisher and Larry Susskind, in their work
at the Program on Negotiation at Harvard Law
School, suggest there are several characteristics to
look for in a "good agreement." Though these
characteristics do not, by themselves, prove that a
final agreement is good or appropriate, they do pro-
vide a starting point for evaluating the final
agreement.
• The agreement should be better than the alterna-
tives to no agreement faced by the other parties
to the agreement. If it is not, then the parties who
have "forgone" their better alternatives in order
to secure the agreement should have done so
voluntarily.
• It is not possible to make the agreement better
without hurting another party. Negotiations
should not be concluded if there is another, more
elegant, agreement that will leave some even bet-
ter off at no expense to anyone else.
• The agreement is feasible and stable. All
necessary parties are committed to its implemen-
tation. Where performance of the agreement
depends upon uncertain events in the future (e.g.,
elections or judicial rulings), then contingent
agreements or renegotiation provisions are in-
cluded in the agreement in order to prevent the
entire agreement from unravelling.
• The process for reaching agreement did not harm
relationships between people who will have to live
or work together in the future. Relationships
should improve as a result of the negotiations, not
deteriorate.
• All parties to the agreement are satisfied with the
agreement. No one should feel "taken." In addi-
tion, the community at large should feel that the
agreement is legitimate and that a good precedent
has been set.
• The agreement should account for the latest scien-
tific, technical and general knowledge related to
the situation. The outcome should be as "wise"
as possible.
• And finally, the agreement should be reached in
a timely and cost-effective manner. The parties in-
volved should feel that negotiations were the most
efficient and least costly method available.
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Published by: International City Management
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Reviewer:
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Negotiation: It occurs every day in local govern-
ment offices. Whether it is the city negotiating with
i a local interest group or a planner talking with the
developer of the new downtown office center, nego-
tiation has taken on a whole new meaning to local
governments. Increasingly, complex government in-
terests and the high cost of unresolved conflicts has
made negotiation an essential skill which all local
government administrators and managers must
possess. Since federal funds are being withdrawn
from city budgets, the private sector is playing a
more important role in city development and
finance. Administrators have to be prepared to
negotiate with supervisors, staff, department heads,
and elected officials, as well as with outside indi-
viduals and agencies. Managers deal daily with
resource allocation questions, land use disputes, and
social tensions, for example. Negotiation may take
place outside the local jurisdiction — in state, reg-
ional, or federal arenas. Local government officials
must be able to feel confident when dealing with
their colleagues in both the public and private
sectors.
Successful Negotiation in Local Government of-
ers a selection of current essays on the subject of
negotiation in the local government setting. It pro-
ides a compendium of the latest tools and tech-
niques of negotiating, while also describing the
psychology, dynamics, and current language of the
negotiation process. The tools and techniques of
negotiation are rapidly changing. Collective bar-
gaining and late-night sessions around the bargain-
ing table do not typify most of the negotiation
which takes place now. Today's negotiation is a new
field with a new vocabulary such as "negotiated in-
vestment strategy, facilitation, and med-arb." Local
officials will have to integrate this myriad of tools
and techniques into their daily routines.
This book was published by the International
City Management Assocation (ICMA) in 1985 as
part of its Practical Management Series. The series
focuses on providing currently available informa-
tion on issues which are important to local practi-
tioners. In 1980 ICMA predicted that "in the future,
the prime skill of management will be brokering and
negotiation."
The book is divided into four sections: introduc-
tion, the basics, the psychology of negotiation, and
application. The first article by Jeff Luke sets the
tone for the rest of the book. Luke describes three
arenas for negotiation: the intersectoral arena
(public-private, public-public, and non-profit-
public/private); the intergovernmental arena (con-
tracting with other government agencies); and the
neighborhood arena. . "which is the setting for
triangular partnerships and land use decisions."
The second section of the book focuses on the
basic tools and techniques of negotiation. The first
two articles provide an overview of the latest tech-
niques and answer some of the most commonly
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asked questions about negotiations. They also pro-
vide insight into some of the right and wrong ways
to approach the negotiation process. The other arti-
cles in this section go into more depth on individual
tools. Two articles are concerned with negotiated in-
vestment strategy (NIS), which takes a comprehen-
sive approach to the public decision-making process,
and the final two sections deal with labor-
management negotiation.
The third section of the book offers a unique
perspective on the process of negotiation. This col-
lection deals with the psychological, emotional, and
interpersonal dynamics underlying the negotiation
process. Power relationships are discussed by Roger
Fisher who coauthored the book Getting to Yes:
Negotiating Without Giving In. Decision analysis,
which is a way of anticipating other people's
responses based upon the options open to them, is
the topic of another article in this section. The ar-
ticles are interesting, and they are an important ad-
dition to the book's discussion of the matter-of-fact
basics of the negotiation process.
Finally, the fourth section pulls everything
together by presenting five articles which examine
real cases involving both successful and unsuccessful
negotiations. The articles discuss a wide array of
tools and situations in which the local administrator
may find himself. The generic tools, discussed in the
earlier sections of the book, are now applied to ac-
tual dispute resolutions. The chapter includes a con-
troversy over land annexation, a water allocation
problem, a hypothetical case involving the siting of
a landfill, the use of NIS in formulating long-range
planning goals, and finally three cases involving
land use issues.
Successful Negotiation in Local Government
should be on the shelf of every local government
administrator and manager. It is an important work
which describes the essentials of good negotiations.
The editors have gathered the expertise and experi-
ence of some of the most prominent people in the
field and have produced a very readable book which
includes over one hundred bibliographical sources.
Local officials will need to have current tools and
techniques at their disposal in order to deal with the
increasing complexity of government at the local
level. Successful Negotiation provides the up-to-date
information on the negotiation process which local
administrators and managers can utilize.
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Commentary
Some Thoughts On Planners and the
New Dispute Resolution
David R. Godschalk
Dispute resolution techniques have come a long way from the old ad hoc approaches derived from aca-
demic psychology experiments. The new methods deserve an important place in the planner's tool kit.
In fact, planners trained in the new techniques often are better equipped to resolve development disputes
than lawyers or outside mediators.
I am aware of the sometimes exaggerated claims for negotiated settlement as the latest social panacea.
Dispute resolution is no silver bullet. Many development disputes can not, and should not, be settled by
negotiation. Some disputes should be decided in the courts; cases where the public interest is trampled
do not deserve a win/win compromise. But the judicious use of dispute resolution could work out a large
number of the development conflicts that planners face every day. The results would be more effective,
efficient, and beneficial to all sides.
I believe that planners have an edge over lawyers and outside mediators due to our understanding of
the substance of development disputes, as opposed simply to the process of dispute resolution. Our train-
ing as problem solvers equips us to master the process side, while our knowledge of urban systems equips
us to generate creative alternative solutions. With some grounding in the theory and methods of dispute
resolution, planners can learn to become very effective at seeking to further the public interest through
use of these new techniques.
While there are a number of specialized methods available, the two main types of conflict settlement
approaches are negotiation and mediation. Negotiation techniques are those that involve the opposing
[parties directly. An example would be negotiation between a city planning director and a developer over
Ithe amount of off-site facility improvements that a proposed project should pay for. Mediation techniques
[are those that introduce a neutral third party between the opposing sides. An example would be Virginia's
[Local Government Commission, which is an outside agency called in to facilitate and manage negotiation
[over annexation disputes.
Most local development disputes involve direct negotiation between the parties. These are the bread
ind butter zoning, subdivision review, and project design issues that planners face continuously. They
lostly deal with smaller scale disagreements where a planner trained in dispute resolution can make a
lajor difference in both the quality of the built environment and in the efficiency of the development
lanagement process.
Occasionally a development dispute gets out of hand. The issues or the personalities become too volatile
for effective negotiation. At this stage, an outside mediator can step into the situation and provide the
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neutral conflict management necessary to keep the talks from breaking down. Knowing when this stage
has been reached, and where to go for outside help, are very important. Most planners, unless they are
exceptionally skilled and can easily step out of their own jurisdictions in order to help other governments,
will not play mediator roles.
To make more effective use of planners' innate negotiating capacity, we need to invest in basic profes-
sional development. Within the planning schools, courses in dispute resolution can offer a grounding in
the new methods and theory. My experience in teaching such a course to graduate students in planning,
law, public administration, and business has convinced me of this need. Workshops and short courses
can carry this grounding to practicing planners.
We also need more documentation of the successes and failures of development dispute resolution cases.
Because the field is relatively new, case studies such as those in this issue are extremely valuable, though
scarce. Planners should be encouraged to write about their experiences for others to use.
Finally, we need to expand the number of dispute resolution centers, where research and mediation ser-
vices are combined. Universities are good locations for such centers, though not the only possibilities. Given
the development pace and controversy in the South, it is surprising and disappointing that so few dispute
resolution institutions are located here. A concerted effort is needed to fill this gap.
A Review of Key Books on Negotiation
Dispute resolution has come out of the psychology lab. During recent years, the field has made major
advances in theory, methods, and applications to real planning situations. Much of this progress has been
pushed along by work at the Harvard Program on Negotiation.
Howard Raiffa has provided a theoretical concept for assessing the effectiveness of negotiation in his
identification of the "efficient frontier." For any negotiating situation, this frontier describes the combina-
tions of settlement options that exhaust all possible gains for the parties involved. It spurs negotiators
to stay at the table until they can find no further joint gains. Raiffa's book, The Art and Science of Negotiation
(Harvard University Press, 1982), includes several planning examples along with others from international
diplomacy, government, and business.
Roger Fisher and William Ury have advanced the basic methods of negotiation. Their deceptively simple
paperback text, Getting to Yes (Penguin Books, 1983), lays out solid principles for effective bargaining.
One of their key tenets concerns identifying the power balance represented by the parties' alternatives to
a negotiated agreement, which is the costs and benefits of withdrawing from the negotiation and seeking
satisfaction from an alternative source, such as the courts. For weaker parties, developing an acceptable
alternative improves your power at the negotiating table.
Planning applications of the new dispute resolution approaches so far are mostly centered on environmental
management issues. Even Sullivan's Resolving Development Dispute Through Negotiations (Plenum, 1984),
contains disappointingly few cases related to urban development management issues. But this is changing
as the planners involved in the field, such as Larry Susskind and others, begin to publish accounts of the






The University of North Carolina
New East 033A





Chapel Hill, N.C. 27514
000
NORTH PAROL IMA COLLECTION
WILSON LIBRARY 02hA
CHAPFl HILL.jNC 27514
